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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The District Court of the Fifth Judicial District in
and for Beaver County, Utah issued a Decree of Divorce in this
matter on December 21, 1995.
of appeal on April 5, 1996,

Appellant timely filed his notice
Jurisdiction in this appeal is

proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Whether the trial court properly considered a

leasehold interest in 277 acres of sagebrush land as a marital
asset worth $90,000, where Appellant's mother gave Appellant,
during his marriage to Appellee, a forty-year lease, which
specifically prohibited any assignments or sublets, for the
exclusive and mandatory use of farming and decades of farming
activities on the land had proven unprofitable?
When determining a trial court's assigned value for
marital assets, appellate courts apply an "abuse of discretion"
standard.

Shepard v. Shepard, 867 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah App.

1994); Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah App. 1994).
II.

Whether the trial court properly imputed Appellant

with an income of $1,500 a month for the purpose of computing
child support payments when Appellant's current and historical
earnings were less than $1,000 per month.
The question of whether a trial court properly awarded
child support payments is an "abuse of discretion" standard of

1

appellate review.

Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah

1985) .
III.

Whether the trial court's award of visitation

rights to Appellant was proper when Appellant's right to
overnight visitation with his teenage sons is conditioned on
Appellant not having his cohabitant and her two small children
spend the night in his home.
The trial court's grant of visitation rights is an
"abuse of discretion" standard for appellate review.

Watson v.

Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1992).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.5(7) (Supp. 1995)
provides, in relevant part, that:
(a) Income may not be imputed to a parent
unless the parent stipulates to the amount
imputed or a hearing is held and a finding
made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed.
(ID) If income is imputed to a parent, the
income shall be based on the employment
potential and probable earnings as derived
from work history, occupation qualification^/
and prevailing earnings for persons of
similar backgrounds in the community,
(c) If a parent has no recent work history,
income shall be imputed at least at the
federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work weeK.
TO impute a greater income, the judge in a
judicial proceeding or the presiding officer
in an administrative hearing shall enter
specific findings of fact as to the
evidentiary basis for the imputation.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature

of

the

Case

Trial on this divorce matter was held before Judge J.
Philip Eves on January 10-11, 1995.

Judge Eves entered a

Memorandum Decision on June 19, 1995, and issued a final Decree
of Divorce on December 20, 1995.
This appeal is a divorce matter that raises issues
regarding the definition and valuation of marital assets, the
imputation of income to determine the appropriate amount of child
support award and the rights of a father to overnight visitation
with his teenage sons.
JB. Statement
1.

of

Facts

Appellant's mother, Rosemary Bowman, gave

Appellant a forty year lease on 277 acres of sagebrush land (the
"Goodwin Lease") on April 27, 1984.
1221.)

(R. at 292DY-EC, 1110-15,

The Goodwin Lease named only Appellant, Mr. Craig Davie,

as lessee and does not mention Appellee, Ms. Jetta Davie.
292DY-EC, 1111.)
and sublets.

(R. at

The Goodwin Lease proscribes all assignments

(R. at 292EA, 1112.)

The Goodwin Lease

automatically terminates on several occurrences, including five
years after Appellant's death.
2.

(R. at 292DY-EC, 1111.)

Before Appellant began farming the Goodwin Farm,

Mr. Clifford Cook farmed the Goodwin Farm for twenty years and
never made a profit.

(R. at 1403-04.)

Appellee testified that

the Goodwin Farm pays the expenses to run the farm and there was
3

never any profit from the operations.

(R. at 1182.)

Appellant

testified that he has historically operated at a loss in farming
the Goodwin Farm.

(R. at 1301, 1306.)

All of the witnesses at

trial seemed to agree that farming was "an expensive hobby."

(R.

at 1367.)
3.

Judge Eves found that although the Goodwin Lease

was solely in Appellant's name, Appellee "had been helping to
farm the property and had developed considerable sweat equity
therein."

(R. at 801; 1559.)
4.

Appellant offered her opinion that Goodwin Lease

was worth $244,100.

(R. at 1025-26.)

Appellant assumed that the

$3 0 per acre per year that she was paying to lease the 13 Mile
Farm was a fair value for the Goodwin Farm also.
5.

(R. at 1026.)

In his Memorandum Decision, Judge Eves fixed the

value of the Goodwin Lease "at $3,000 per year X 30 years, which
equals a total current value of $90,000."

(R. at 699.)

When

later asked about discounting the stream of payments to present
value, Judge Eves responded that the $90,000 figure was already
discounted to present value but "[i]t just isn't included in the
calculation."
6.

(R. at 1558.)
The trial court awarded the Goodwin Lease to

Appellant as a joint marital asset at a "current" value of
$90,000.

(R. at 801.)

In addition to the "$90,000" Goodwin

Lease, Appellant was awarded $57,069 in other marital property

4

for a total value of $147,069.00.

(R. at 803.)

Appellee was

awarded $121,450.00 which included the parties' house and the
Kirk/13 Mile Farm, a 640 acre farm owned in fee simple with an
additional 13 0 acres subject to a leasehold interest that Judge
Eves valued at $40,000.
7.

(R. at 787, 803.)

Judge Eves awarded Appellant a larger share of the

marital debt "in view of the fact that [Appellant] received a
higher value of the marital property."

(R. at 808.)

Appellee

was assigned debts totalling $74,651.63; Appellant was assigned
marital debt totalling $105,821.45.
8.

(R. at 807.)

Appellant's historical earnings were less than

$10,000 per year for several years preceding divorce.
1060-63.)

(R. at

Judge Eves imputed Appellant with a monthly income of

$1,500 and used that figure to compute Appellant's child support
obligation of $384.60 per month.
9.

(R. at 752.)

Judge Eves awarded Appellant with "liberal and

reasonable" rights of visitation with his teenage sons.
782.)

(R. at

However, Judge Eves conditioned Appellant's right to

overnight visitation with the following:

"It is not appropriate

for the boys to visit in the home of [Appellant] when Grace
McFall and her two children are spending the night there."
at 782-83.)

(R.

Ms. McFall is both an employee and cohabitant of

Appellant who had been residing with Appellant for almost
fourteen months when the Decree of Divorce was entered.
1415-17.)
5

(R. at

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Appellant is entitled to reversal of the Decree of
Divorce on at least three independent grounds: (1) Judge Eves
failed to provide any detailed, specific findings on his
financial determination of the value of the Goodwin Farm Lease
and his inclusion of it as a joint marital asset; (2) Judge Eves
erroneously imputed Appellant with a monthly income substantially
higher than his historical earnings; and (3) Judge Eves
improperly restricted Appellant's right to overnight visitations
with his teenage sons.
ARGUMENT
I.

Judge Eves Abused His Discretion by Including the
Goodwin Farm Lease In Appellant's Apportionment of
Marital Property at A Value of $90,000.

A.

The Goodwin Lease Is Not "Property."
The term "property" is not defined in Utah's divorce

code.

Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 305 (Utah 1988)

("^Property' is nowhere defined in our divorce code.").

There is

no Utah law on point to make the determination whether a lease is
"property" for the purpose of the division of marital assets.
The "Goodwin Lease" contains several unique characteristics that
are not typically associated with a marital asset:

(1) it

automatically terminates if Appellant attempts to sublet or
assign the premises; 2) it automatically terminates if Appellant
does not consistently farm the land with the best course of
husbandry practiced in the geographical vicinity; (3) it
6

automatically terminates five years after Appellant's death; (4)
Appellant is required to make an annual rental payment; and (5)
the lessor reserved the right to give five acres of the premises
to each of Appellant's brothers and sisters.

(R. at 292DY-EC,

1110-14.)
B.

The Goodwin Lease Is Not A Joint Marital Asset,

To the extent that the Goodwin Lease is property, if
indeed it is property, it should not be considered a marital
asset because the Lease was given to Appellant during the course
of the marriage.

Appellant's mother, Ms. Rosemary Bowman, as

lessor, leased the Goodwin Farm to Appellant for forty years for
an annual rental payment of One Dollar ($1.00) per year.
292DY.)

(R. at

The Lease names Craig Davie alone as "lessee" and makes

no mention of Appellee.

(R. at 292DY, 1111.)

Hence, to the

extent that the Goodwin Lease can be considered property, it can
be considered a gift to Appellant from his mother.
Although trial courts have wide discretion in property
divisions, the general rule is to award the gift to the donee and
to divide the remaining property so that the donee does not lose
the benefit of his or her gift.

Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 307-08.

"[T]he donee or heir spouse should not lose the benefit of his or
her gift or inheritance by the trial court's automatically or
arbitrarily awarding the other spouse an equal amount of the
remaining property which was acquired by their joint efforts to
offset the gifts or inheritance."
7

Id.

Judge Eves grossly

offset the division of marital property and grossly distorted the
equitable division of property between the parties by awarding
Appellant the Goodwin Lease as a joint marital asset with a
court-imposed value of $90,000,
Judge Eves stated that he considered the Goodwin Lease
as marital property due to Appellee's "sweat equity" in her
assistance farming and repairing the property after a flood.
at 1559.)

(R.

See Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308 (noting an exception to

the general rule of awarding gifts to donee party when the other
spouse has by her efforts contributed to the enhancement or
maintenance of that property).

If the Goodwin Lease is indeed

"property," then it should be treated in a similar manner to
other marital assets.

For instance, the labors performed by

Appellee on the Goodwin Farm were in essence similar to the
labors that she performed on the parties' Cow Hollow property.
After Appellee requested that Cow Hollow be considered a joint
marital asset, but Judge Eves stated the following:
[Appellee] has argued that she acquired
marital property rights by virtue of her
labor on the [Cow Hollow] property through
the years of the marriage. The Court
disagrees. The plaintiff enjoyed the use of
the property along with the rest of the
family and as part of that use participated
in maintenance and improvements. The Court
finds that the labors performed were not
inconsistent with the family use of the
property and created no marital right in the
plaintiff.

8

(R. at 688-89.)

Appellee's labors on the Goodwin Farm were

consistent with family use of the property.

Had the family

earned any profits from the Goodwin Farm, Appellee would have
"enjoyed" those profits along with the rest of the family.
Appellee performed labors on both properties that were consistent
with maintenance and enhancements of the property.

After a flood

on the Goodwin Farm, Appellee assisted Appellant and others in
the installation of a new irrigation system.

(R. at 801.)

Appellee also performed routine farming labors on the Goodwin
Farm which were consistent with the family's "expensive hobby."
Judge Eves' reasoning denying Appellee a "sweat equity" interest
in the Cow Hollow property should apply with equal force in
denying Appellee a joint marital interest in the Goodwin Farm
Lease.
C.

Judge Eves Erroneously Overvalued the Goodwin
Lease,

The trial court artificially inflated the value of the
Goodwin Farm Lease by setting a mere leasehold interest in the
property at a "current" value of $90,000.

By comparison, the

Kirk/13 Mile farm contains 640 acres of land that is owned in fee
simple with a leaseback interest in an additional 130 acres.
at 787, 803.)

(R.

The Kirk/13 Mile Farm is over double the size of

the Goodwin Farm, is comparable in other respects, has an incomegenerating gravel pit (R. at 1313) , and the trial court placed
its value at $40,000—only 44% of the value it placed on the
9

leasehold interest in the 277 acre Goodwin Farm.1

By overvaluing

the Goodwin Farm Lease and awarding it to Appellant, Judge Eves
has grossly misapportioned the remaining marital assets and
debts.

Exclusive of the Goodwin Lease, Judge Eves awarded

Appellant with only 32%2 of the marital assets and 59%3 of the
total marital debt.

(R. at 803-05.)

As a general rule, marital

property should be shared equally between the parties unless
unusual circumstances, memorialized in adequate findings, require
otherwise.

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1022 (Utah App. 1993) (citing

Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah App. 1990)).

Judge Eves abused

his discretion by setting the value of the Goodwin Lease at
$90,000 and using it to unfairly distribute the marital debts and
assets.

See Hall, 858 P.2d at 1022 (stating that trial courts

must distribute property between the parties to a divorce in a
fair, systematic fashion); Erickseon v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 802
P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah App. 1990) (stating that each party is

1

$40,000 divided by $90,000 equals forty-four percent.

2

Appellant was awarded assets valued at $57,069 plus the
Goodwin Lease. Appellee was awarded assets valued at $121,450
for a combined total marital assets of $178,519 plus the Goodwin
Lease. Exclusive of the Goodwin Lease, Appellant's $57,069 value
of assets divided by the total marital asset value of $178,519
equals thirty-two percent of the total value of assets.
3

Appellant was awarded $105,821.45 of the marital debt.
Appellee was awarded only $74,651.63 of the marital debt, for a
combined total of $180,473.08 of marital debt. Appellant's
apportionment of $105,821.45 divided by the total debt,
$180,473.08 equals fifty-nine percent of the total marital debt
awarded to Appellant.
10

presumed to be entitled to all of his separate property and fifty
percent of the marital property).
The Memorandum Decision states that the "Court fixes
the value of the [Goodwin] lease at $3,000 per year X [times] 30
years,4 which equals a total current value of $90,000."
699.)

(R. at

Other than this statement, Judge Eves failed to enter any

specific, detailed findings supporting his financial
determination of the value of the Goodwin Farm Lease.

Judge Eves

provided no findings as to how he reached the value of $3,000 per
year.

Judge Eves abused his discretion by failing to include

finding that were "sufficiently detailed" and failed to "include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the
ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."

Hall v.

Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1021 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Hansen v.
Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1987)).

In Hall, the Court specifically stated that

the "trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to enter
specific, detailed findings supporting its financial
determinations."

Hall, 858 P.2d at 1021.

Judge Eves' valuation

of the Goodwin Farm Lease should be reversed due to the lack of

4

Judge Eves' calculation was also erroneous in that the
Goodwin Farm Lease term had less than 28 years remaining when the
Decree of Divorce was entered. The forty year Lease term runs
from March 1, 1983 until February 28, 2023. The Decree of
Divorce was entered on December 21, 1995; the Lease term only had
2 7 years and two month remaining when the Decree of Divorce was
entered.
11

sufficient findings.

Gardner v. Gardner. 748 P.2d 1076, 1078

(Utah 1988) (reversing the valuation of medical assets and
remanding for reconsideration of the distribution of marital
assets based on the trial court's "sparse" findings of fact on
valuation issues).
Additionally, even using his own figures, Judge Eves
still failed to discount a $3,000 stream of payments over thirty
years to its present value.5

See Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P. 2d

1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) ("Regardless of how remote the full value
of an asset is, it still has present value.").

See also In re

Continental Airlines, Inc., 134 Bankr. 536, 538 (Del. 1991) ("The
parties agree the value of the leasehold is the difference
between the fair market rent . . . and the below market rent
payable under the Lease Agreement, discounted to present
value."); County of Los Angeles v. Klinq. 99 Cal. Rptr. 642, 647
(Cal. Ct. App. 1972) (granting a new trial on issue of the
valuation of a leasehold interest).

The Goodwin Farm Lease, in

and of itself, produces no income—and the evidence showed that
farming activity on the Goodwin Farm also didn't produce any
income. (R. at 1182, 1301, 1306, 1403-04.)

The Lease on the

Goodwin Farm contains language of invalidation and expressly

5

According to generally accepted accounting principles,
a stream of payments of $3,000 per year for thirty years equals a
present value of $30,820.96 at a 9% interest rate. These
computations were provided to Appellant by the accounting firm of
Hansen, Steed, Bradshaw & Malmrose in Salt Lake City, Utah.
12

provides that the property cannot be assigned or sublet.
2 92EA.)

(R. at

In essence, the Goodwin Farm is nothing more than an

expensive hobby for Appellant, who forfeits the Goodwin Lease if
he chooses to cease his farming activities.

All witnesses agreed

that no profit has ever been realized from farming the Goodwin
property.

(R. at 1182, 1301, 1306, 1403-04.)

Hence, Judge Eves'

value of $90,000 for the Goodwin Lease is not supported by the
evidence.
Judge Eves' derived the $3 0 per acre per year rate from
Appellee's testimony:
Q. An we have talked about Cow Hollow.
We've talked about the Goodwin Farm also,
which is number 33. It looks like there is
another mistake. You put a value earlier on
the Goodwin Farm of $244,100, and now we've
got items 3 3 and 3 4 that shows $5,07 0 per
year on 33 and $2,400 per year on 34.
A. I think —
Q. What are those figures?
A. We simply divided it up in — into what
we thought the value of that property would
be if someone were to take over that lease
for a year.
Q. I see.
A. And we priced it at the same thing that
Smithfield had leased the 13-Mile farm to me
for a year, which was $3 0 per acre. And I'm
assuming that's a fair value for — for the
Goodwin Farm too.
(Emphasis added.) (R. at 1024-25.)

Appellee's counsel later

admitted that Appellee failed to discount her value of the
Goodwin Farm to present value.

(R. at 1113-14).

As already

discussed above, the Goodwin Lease' true value, if any, is
substantially below Appellee's figures due to the substantial
13

restrictions the Lease places on Appellant's use of the Goodwin
premises.

(R. at 242DY-EC.)

Judge Eves' reliance on Appellee's

mistaken testimony as his sole basis for his valuation of the
Goodwin Farm was an abuse of discretion and led to his
compounding the Appellee's errors and misunderstanding of the
concept of present value.

(R. at 801, 1113-14, 1558.)

Furthermore, the Goodwin Farm is a marital asset only
to the extent that it is an asset.

The Goodwin Farm Lease is not

an asset because it does not produce any discretionary income.
Testimony at trial established that the parties had consistently
lost money on their farming activities and in this respect, the
Goodwin Farm Lease may even be considered a debt.

Also, any

potential future profits from the Goodwin Farm would be derived
from Appellant's own hard labor.

See Erickseon v. Wasatch Manor,

Inc., 802 P.2d 1314, 1323 (Utah App. 1990) (noting that future
income conditioned on personal services is not a marital
interest).

All of the testimony at trial showed that any income

derived from farming operations on the Goodwin Farm must
necessarily be reinvested back into it. (R. at 1182, 1301, 1306,
1403-04.)
In valuing the Lease on the Goodwin Farm, Judge Eves
should have first obtained an appraisal of the property's value
if owned in fee simple, for the "total value of all interests
cannot exceed the value of the property as a whole."
Comm'n v. Brown, 531 P.2d 1294, 1296 (Utah 1975).
14

State Road

Furthermore,

the trial court failed to consider the terms and restrictions on
the Goodwin Lease.

For instance, the fact that the lessee cannot

assign or sublet the premises and must farm the property severely
decreases the value of the Lease (R. at 292DY-EC), especially
when farming operations on the Goodwin Farm are historically
unprofitable.
II.

Judge Eves Abused His Discretion In Imputing
Appellant's Monthly Income To Be $1,500.
The trial court erred in imputing an income of $1,500 a

month to Appellant.

The evidence at trial proved that Appellant

had been earning less than $1000 per month for the past four
years.

(R. at 1060-63.)

In Hill v. Hill. 869 P.2d 963, 966

(Utah App. 1994), the Utah Court of Appeals stated that:
[T]he court may not, however, impute income
to a parent for the purpose of determining
the appropriate level of child support unless
the parent either stipulates to the amount
imputed or there is a hearing in which the
finding is made that the parent is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(7)(a).
(Emphasis added.)

Appellant neither stipulated to an imputed

monthly income of $1,500, nor was he given a hearing where a
finding was made that Appellant was underemployed.

In fact,

Appellee testified at trial that Appellant had been earning
approximately the same income their entire married life.
1062.)
that

(R. at

Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45-7.5(b) (Supp. 1995) provides

ff

[i]f income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be

based on the employment potential and probable earnings as
15

derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and
prevailing earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in the
community."

Appellant's work history and occupational

qualifications were related to farming operations.

Appellant had

been farming for several years before the divorce and he never
earned over $1,000 a month income.

(R. at 1062.)

Furthermore,

Judge Eves did not receive any evidence regarding the "prevailing
earnings for persons of similar background in the community," nor
did he "enter specific findings of fact as to the evidentiary
basis for imputation" as provided in Utah Code Ann. Section 7845-7.5(c) (Supp. 1995).

Judge Eves' failure to make the findings

required by Section 78-45-7.5 alone justifies a reversal of his
determination on imputation of income.

Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d

1018, 1026 (Utah App. 1993).
In Hall, the trial court imputed income to a husband
for the purposes of calculating child support and alimony.

The

trial court failed to make findings that the husband was
voluntarily underemployed and failed to make explicit or implicit
findings concerning prevailing earnings for persons in similar
backgrounds.

In Hall, the husband had earned $100,000 per year

for the three years preceding divorce.

Ten days before trial,

the husband in Hall began a new job earning only $40,000 per
year.

The trial court imputed the husband with a historical

income of $98,499 per year and was reversed on appeal for an
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abuse of discretion for failing to comply with the statutory
requirements of Section 78-45-7.5.

Hall, 858 P.2d at 1023-1026.

The facts of this case are much more egregious than
those in Hall.

In Hall, the court looked to the past three years

of earnings and imputed an income based on that amount.

In this

case, Judge Eves considered Appellant's past three years earnings
and imputed an income over 150% greater than Appellant's
historical earnings.

Hence, Judge Eves' imputation of additional

income in the absence of evidence to support such imputation was
improper.

See Bohnsack v. Bohnsack, 586 N.Y.S.2d 369 (N.Y. App.

Div. 1992).

See also Cox v. Coxf 877 P.2d 1262, 1267-68 (Utah

App. 1994) (stating that trial courts have appropriately relied
on historical income as a basis of imputing a spouse's income).
III. Judge Eves Abused His Discretion By Denying Appellant
the Right to Overnight Visitations In His Home With His
Sons.
Judge Eves restricted Appellant's overnight visitation
rights with his 15 year-old twin sons in that the Court found:
[I]t is not appropriate for the boys to visit
in the home of the defendant when Grace
McFall and her two children are spending the
night there. Sheb and Seth have expressed
discomfort with visiting overnight when their
father is entertaining Ms. McFall overnight.
That situation is to be avoided during
overnight visitations. The defendant is
further awarded such liberal and reasonable
visitation rights as may be worked out
between the parties in advance.
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(Emphasis added.)- (R. at 685.)

At trial, however, Sheb and Seth

never expressed such discomfort with visiting Appellant
overnight.

Seth testified as follows:

Q. Do you have any difficulties visiting
with your father?
A. No. Not — huh-uh.
Q. Do you have any difficulties with one Gracie
McFall?
A. Yes. A little.
Q. What is the difficulty there, if any?
A. I just like to visit with my father. Just
him.
Q. Is that a personal preference on your
part?
A. Yes.
(R. at 1502.)

Seth did not even mention overnight visits.

testified that he likes to visit with his father alone —
one.

He

one on

Such testimony may justify the trial court to make a

finding that the boys ought to visit their father one at a time,
but certainly does not support a finding that the boys have
"expressed discomfort with visiting overnight when their father
is entertaining Ms. McFall overnight."
Similarly, Sheb's testimony also made no mention of
overnight visits when Ms. McFall was present.

Sheb testified as

follows:
Q. Is there anyone that lives in [Appellant's]
mobile home with him?
A. I — not that I know of. Just Gracie —
Q. Okay.
A. — and her kids.
Q. Do you have any problem in being in the mobile
home with Gracie and her children?
A. I don't like it. I don't.
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(R. at 1495.)

Sheb's testimony did not draw any distinction

between daytime and nighttime visits to Appellant's

home.

Judge

Eves finding was not that the boys could not visit Appellant's
home when Ms. McFall was present, rather Judge Eves ruled that
only overnight visitations were barred when Ms. McFall was
present.

Despite the boys' testimony, Judge Eves awarded

Appellant "liberal" visitation rights.

The Record provides no

evidentiary basis for Judge Eves' finding concerning overnight
visits.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing points and authorities,
Appellant hereby respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Decree of Divorce and
remand for further proceedings.

First, Judge Eves' overvaluation

of the Goodwin Lease led to an inequitable distribution of
marital debts and assets.

Judge Eves failed to make sufficient

findings to support his financial determinations.

Second, Judge

Eves erroneously imputed Appellant with a monthly income 150%
greater than his historical earnings.

Finally, Judge Eves

inappropriately restrained Appellant's right to overnight
visitations with his teenage sons.
DATED this

/ <% day of June, 1996.
SCALLEY & READING
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Addendum

9I

A":

Memorandum Decision, Dated June 19, 1995

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR BEAVER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE,
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

CRAIG VERNON DAVIE,

)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

)

Civil No. 94-CV-29

The above-entitled matter came before the Court for Trial on January 10th and
11th, 1995, in Beaver County. The parties were present and represented by their
respective counsel, Willard R. Bishop representing the plaintiff and J. Bruce Reading
representing the defendant. The Court heard evidence presented by both parties and
at the end of the second day, due to the lateness of the hour, the parties requested to
be allowed to submit their arguments in writing. A schedule for submission of the
arguments was set and the Court took the matter under submission pending the filing
of the arguments. Thereafter on May 23, 1995, plaintiff filed a Notice of Readiness for
Decision. The Court having now reviewed the submissions of the parties hereby enters
the following Memorandum Decision and Orders.

l

DIVORCE
The Court finds that jurisdiction and venue have been established. That the
plaintiff is entitled to a divorce from the defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable
differences.
CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILDREN
The plaintiff seeks custody of the parties' two minor children, Sheb and Seth
Davie. The twins are now approximately 15 years of age. The defendant, on the other
hand, agrees that the plaintiff should be the physical custodian on the children but seeks
an award of joint legal custody. Section 30-3-10.2 U.C.A. set outs the factors for the
Court to consider in determining whether or not a joint legal custody order is appropriate.
It provides as follows:
" 1 . The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that joint legal
custody is in the best interest of the child and:
(a) both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or
(b) both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal
custody."
The Court is well aware of the intense hostility and lack of cooperation that the
parties have exhibited toward one another during these proceedings. The parties have
not agreed to an order of joint legal custody and it appears evident to the Court that the
parties are not capable of implementing a joint custody order as they are unable to
cooperate in any aspect of their dealings. The Court therefore determines that it would
not be in the best interests of Sheb and Seth to place them in a joint legal custody
2

situation. Accordingly the Court orders custody of the two minor children to the plaintiff,
it appearing that she has been the primary caretaker of the children.
VISITATION
The defendant should be, and hereby is, awarded reasonable rights of visitation
as provided in § 30-3-35 U.C.A. Said visitation is conditioned upon the defendant's
compliance with the following orders:
a.

The visitation is to be arranged so that it does not unnecessarily or

unreasonably interfere with the school and work activities of the boys.
b. The defendant's right to overnight visitation is conditioned upon providing
suitable living quarters for the boys during the visit. The Court specifically finds that it
is not appropriate for the boys to visit in the home of the defendant when Grace McFall
and her two children are spending the night there. Sheb and Seth have expressed
discomfort with visiting overnight when their father is entertaining Ms. McFall overnight.
That situation is to be avoided during overnight visitations. The defendant is further
awarded such other liberal and reasonable visitation as may be worked out between the
parties in advance.
CHILD SUPPORT
The defendant is ordered to pay to plaintiff child support in accordance with the
Child Support Guidelines. The Court specifically imputes to the defendant income at the
rate of $1,500.00 per month. Although the defendant has testified that he does not earn
3
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that much, the Court is of the opinion that he is capable of earning that much and
imputes that amount to him as his earning ability. The Court further imputes to the
plaintiff income in the amount of $1,000.00 per month.
The Court further determines that the tax deductions for the children are to be
split equally, one to each of the parties, it appearing that the income and ability to
produce income of the parties are roughly equal and that each could equally benefit from
an income tax deduction.
ALIMONY
Neither party has requested alimony in this case as both are healthy, able-bodied
adults and capable of generating their own support. No alimony is awarded to either
party except that the defendant is ordered to assume and pay the debts which the Court
will assess to him hereafter in lieu of alimony.
PROPERTY DIVISION
The Court has spent considerable days in reviewing the testimony given at trial
as well as the written arguments submitted by the parties. From those sources the Court
now awards the following property to the following parties. No value is affixed to those
items which the Court finds are pre-marital property as the value of those items appears
to be irrelevant. The Court has assigned no value to those items which were divided
equally between the parties as it appears that those values would balance out. The
Court has assigned values to those items which were awarded to one party or the other
4

or where there was an unequal division of the asset so that the comparative awards may
be judged.
For ease of reference the Court will refer to the items as they are numbered in the
plaintiffs Summary Of Positions Of The Parties, And Argument which document was the
original document submitted as written argument. Reference is made to the plaintiffs
argument only because the plaintiff lists items in addition to those listed in the
defendant's argument and list them in a slightly different order.
PRE-MARITAL PROPERTY
The Court will first list those items awarded to each party as pre-marital property.
Pre-marital property awarded to the plaintiff is as follows:
1. 250 cc Honda Motorcycle
2. 175 cc Kawasaki/Yamaha Motorcycle
3. Rototiller
4. Antique Sewing Machine
5. Newer Sewing Machine
6. Hope Chest from the Master Bedroom
7. Bunkbeds
8. Single Bed
9. Full Bed
10. Double Bed
11. Bosch Bread Machine
12. Wheat Grinder
13. Piano
14. Electric Keyboard
15. Small colored Television with doors
16. Stereo
17. White tin shed
18. Couch & loveseat
19. Rocking Chair
5
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20.
21.
22.
23.

One Meat Saw
1974 Ford Truck
Plaintiffs personal items stored in the railroad building
Plaintiffs personal items & pre-marital property stored
in the rafters of the garage

The following pre-marital property is awarded to the defendant:
1. All interest in Cow Hollow
2. Fuel tank & stand
3. Portable Welder
^
4. Banks' Life Annuity
5. Paul Revere Annuity
6. Woodburning Stove
7. Tool Chest
8. Settling Tanks & Carrier
9. One Meat Saw
10. Flatbed Trailer
11. 1972 Ford Truck ( and defendant is ordered to remove the truck
from the plaintiffs property)
12. 250 cc Honda Motorcycle
13. 1961 Stock Truck
14. Antique Watch & Case
15. Motor Manuals
16. Fire Extinguisher in garage
17. Lika .35 MM Camera
18. Collection of Purple Bottles
19. Scrap Books and Pictures belonging to defendant
(provided however that the plaintiff may obtain copies for
herself if she so desires)
20. Defendant's pre-marital property stored in the rafters of
the garage (and such personal items as may belong
to him in that storage)
21. The red chainsaw
The Court specifically finds that Cow Hollow is the separate pre-marital property
of the Defendant. Plaintiff has argued that she acquired marital property rights by virtue
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of her labor on the property through the years of the marriage. The Court disagrees.
The plaintiff enjoyed the use of the property along with the rest of the family and as part
of that use participated in maintenance and improvements.

The Court finds that the

labors performed were not inconsistent with the family use of the property and created
no marital property right in the plaintiff. The evidence clearly demonstrates that there
has been no gift and no co-mingling so as to convert a clear piece of separate property
to a marital asset.
MARITAL PROPERTY
The Court awards to the plaintiff as marital property the following items (the
numerical references are to the numbers listed by the plaintiff in her written opening
argument):
1. (Item # 2). Western Rock lease payments are to be used to pay directly to Dr.
Prince for the care of the parties' minor children. After Dr. Prince in paid off, the
remaining balance of the Western Rock Payments are to be equally divided between the
parties. The Court affixes no value since it would be impossible to determine what the
actual value will be after Dr. Prince has been paid.
2. (Item # 5). As agreed by the parties each party is awarded $150.00 from the
sale of hay to Mildred Loveridge.
3. (Item # 8). As agreed by the parties the Court awards the family home to the
plaintiff.

It appears from the evidence that the home was the plaintiffs prior to her
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marriage to the defendant. However it also appears that the defendant has made
significant contributions to the home in terms of a lump sum contribution as well as
payments toward loan obligations. The Court heard evidence from the plaintiff that the
current value of her home is $51,000.00. The Court also heard evidence from an
appraiser that the current value is $78,000.00. The appraiser did admit that he was
unable to find comparable sales in the Minersville area and used comparable sales from
Beaver to establish his value. He also admitted that there were certain repairs and
extensive termite damage that he had not considered at arriving at this value. The Court
is of the opinion that the fair-market value is closer to the $51,000.00 testified to by the
plaintiff rather than the $78,000.00 testified to by the appraiser. Accordingly the Court
fixes the current value of the home at $51,000.00.
The parties testified that there are currently liens totalling $19,850.00 against the
home, consisting of $14,700.00 owed to Rosemary Bowman and $5,150.00 owed to the
plaintiffs parents. Thus the current equity in the home is $31,150.00.
The plaintiff argues that some amount of the equity should be awarded to her as
pre-marital property in view of the fact that she owned the home for several years prior
to her marriage to the defendant. The Court is unable however to determine from the
testimony presented what portion of the equity accrued prior to the marriage and what
portion has accrued since March of 1978, when the parties were married.

It also

appears that the plaintiff and defendant have made various contributions to the home
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from both marital and separate funds. The Court cannot determine by a preponderance
of the evidence the exact nature or amount of the contributions. Therefore the Court
finds that, because of co-mingling, the equity in the home is to treated as marital
property in its total. Therefore the Court awards the home to the plaintiff but fixes the
value of that award at the total of the equity $31,150.00.
4. (Item # 9) The newspaper building located in Milford, Utah, is awarded to the
plaintiff with a value of $6,000.00.
5. (Item # 12) The mineral range AUMS are awarded to the plaintiff with a value
set at $8,000.00.
6. (Items # 13, 14 and 15) The plaintiff is awarded a 1/4 undivided interest in the
NADA Grazing Rights, including associated water rights and improvements.
7. (Item # 16) The Kirk/13-Mile Farm is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set
at $40,000.00.
8. (Item #17) The water rights owned by the parties are divided equally between
them. In the event that the domestic water right cannot be divided, it is awarded to the
plaintiff to be used with the Kirk Farm and one-half of the value of that right is to be paid
by the plaintiff to the defendant as compensation.
9. (Item #18) The Minersville Range AUMS are awarded to the plaintiff. Value
is fixed at $1,350.00.
10. (Item #19) The gravel pit on the Kirk Farm is awarded to the plaintiff, the
9

value is included in the $40,000.00 fixed for the farm hereinabove.
11. (Item # 20) The 13-Mile Farm Lease is awarded to the plaintiff with a value
set at $3,900.00.
12. (Item #23) The horse named Splash is awarded to the plaintiff in the value
fixed in the amount of $700.00. If the horse is not returned to the plaintiff within 30 days
after this judgment is entered, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the cash equivalent
of the value of the horse.
13. (Item #24) The horse named Blondie is likewise awarded to the plaintiff with
a value set in the amount of $700.00. The horse is to be returned to the plaintiff within
30 days of the entry of judgment herein. If the horse is not returned to the plaintiff within
30 days, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the cash equivalent of the value of the
horse.
14. (Items #32, 33 and 34) The plaintiff is awarded 1/2 of the cows owned by
the parties not previously sold or divided. The parties are to work out a mechanism for
fair division of the cows. If the parties are unable to do so the Court will, upon motion
of either party, hold a hearing to enter appropriate orders relating to the distribution of
the cows.
In the event that either side is found to have taken more than his or her fair share
of cows or to have secreted cows from the other party, it is the intent of the Court to
enter an order requiring the offending party to pay to the other party double the value
10

of the cows secreted.
15. (Item # 35) The angus and hereford bulls are awarded to the plaintiff at the
agreed value of $2,000.00.
16. (Item # 43) The John Deere bailer is valued at $2,500.00 and is awarded to
the plaintiff.
17. (Item # 44) The John Deere 2280 Swather is awarded to the plaintiff with a
value set at $10,000.00.
18. (Item # 47) The two ruined engines are awarded equally to the parties. The
6 cylinder engine is awarded to the plaintiff and the 4 cylinder engine is awarded to the
defendant. The values are deemed to be equal.
19. (Item # 48) The stationary welder is awarded to the plaintiff with values
affixed at $300.00.
20. (Item # 50) The John Deere chainsaw is awarded to the plaintiff with a value
set at $300.00.
21. (Items # 52 and 53) The air compressor and air tank are awarded to the
plaintiff with a value for both pieces set at $250.00.
22. (Item # 55) The various remaining farm tools consisting of shovels, rakes,
hoes, pitchforks, etc., are awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at $200.00.
23. (Item # 56) The 1979 Ford Courier Pickup is awarded to the plaintiff with a
value set at $500.00.
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24. (Item # 59) The 1973 Mercury is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at
$50.00.
25. (Item # 66) The 4-Horse Trailer is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set
at $1,000.00.
26. (Item # 70) Plaintiffs Utah State Retirement fund account is awarded to the
plaintiff with a value set at $1,400.00.
27. (Item # 71) The used freezer in the plaintiffs home is awarded to the plaintiff
with a value set at $100.00.
28. (Item # 72) The two used refrigerators found on the plaintiffs property are
awarded to the plaintiff with a value of $100.00 for both pieces.
29. (Item # 76) The four-drawer filing cabinet located in the plaintiffs home is
awarded to the plaintiff. No value is fixed in view of the fact that the metal filing cabinet
of equal value is going to be awarded to the defendant.
30. (Items # 79 and 80) The two lawnmowers are awarded to the plaintiff with
values set at $100.00 each for a total of $200.00.
31. (Item # 82) A pre-fabricated saddle stand is awarded to the plaintiff with a
value set at $50.00.
32. (Item # 92) The plaintiff is awarded the washer and dryer with a value set
at $600.00 for both pieces.
33.

(Item # 98) The plaintiff is awarded the microwave with a value set at
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$100.00.
34. (Item # 99) The plaintiff is awarded the dishwasher with the agreed upon
value of $200.00.
35. (Item # 106) The plaintiff is awarded the organ which is located in the family
home. Its value is set at $600.00 in recognition of the fact that the organ was at least
partially paid for prior to the marriage of the parties.
36. (Item #112) The small color television set is awarded to the plaintiff with a
value fixed at $50.00.
37. (Item # 117) The home computer, printer and programs are awarded to the
plaintiff with a value set at $500.00.
38. (Item #118) The video cassette recorder is awarded to the plaintiff with a
value set at $50.00.
39. (Item #119) The various VCR tapes in the plaintiffs home are awarded to
the plaintiff with a value set at $300.00, provided however that the defendant is to be
allowed to copy any non-commercial tapes that he chooses.
40. (Item # 120) The camcorder is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at
$100.00.
41. (Item # 122) The stereo cabinet is awarded to the plaintiff with a value set
at $50.00.
42. (Item # 123) The almond tin shed which is on a slab located on the real
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estate surrounding the family home is awarded to the plaintiff. The value of that shed
has been included in the price for the home fixed by the court.
43. (Item # 126) The kitchen utensils and luxury appliances, including the fire
extinguisher in the kitchen, are awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at $50.00.
44. (Item # 127) The couch in the basement of the marital home is awarded to
the plaintiff with a value set at $200.00.
45. (Item # 132) The plaintiff is awarded 1/2 of all CD's and cassettes owned by
the parties at the time of their separation. The other 1/2 are awarded to the defendant.
The parties are to divide the cassettes equitably between them. If they are not able to
do so the Court will conduct a hearing for making the division upon notice by either side.
46. (Item # 133) The kitchen table and chairs are awarded to the plaintiff with
a value fixed at $250.00.
47. (Item # 134) The pictures, knick-knacks, clocks, collectibles and porcelain
figures, etc., are awarded to the plaintiff with the value set at $1,000.00.
48. (Item # 140) The post-hole digger which was purchased by the parties is
awarded to the plaintiff with a value set at $200.00.
49. (Item # 141) The poles owned by the parties at the time of the trial in this
matter are divided 1/2 to each party.
50. (Item # 142) The grain barrel only, not including the trailer, is awarded to the
plaintiff with a value fixed at $200.00.
14

51. (Item # 143) The net wire owned by the parties at the time of their trial is
divided equally between them.
52. (Item # 145) The acetylene torch now in the plaintiffs possession is awarded
to her. No value is affixed since the Marquette torch is awarded to the defendant and
the Court deems the two torches of equal value.
53. (Item # 146) The 35 mm Cannon camera js awarded to the plaintiff with a
value set at $100.00.
54. (Item #151) The plaintiff is awarded her wedding ring set. The set was a
gift to her during the marriage. No value is set since it is her separate property.
55. (Item # 162) The 1990 Dodge Dynasty is awarded to the plaintiff with a value
set at $6,000.00.
56. (Item # 169) Each party is awarded his or her own scrap books and pictures.
Each party is authorized to obtain copies of any photographs retained by the other party.
57. (Item #171)

The two work tables are divided between the parties. The

defendant is awarded the table which Sheb and Seth are not currently using for their
reloading equipment. That table is awarded to the plaintiff. The Court deems the tables
of equal value.
The Court will next list the marital property awarded to the defendant.
1. (Item # 1) The obligation owed to the parties by Ray Barnes is awarded to the
defendant with a value set at $375.00.
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2. (Item # 3) The balance owed by Warren Gray for a hay purchase is 1993 is
awarded to the defendant with a value set at $750.00.
3. (Item # 4) The balance owed to the parties for a hay purchase by Mark
Thompson in 1993 is awarded to the defendant with a value set at $475.00.
4.

(Item # 5) The balance owed for the Mildred Loveridge hay purchase is

divided between the parties. The defendant is awarded $150.00 of that balance.
5. (Item # 6 ) The balance owing from Beaver County for gravel purchased from
the 13-Mile/Kirk Farm is awarded to the defendant with a value set at $400.00.
6. (Item # 7) The balance owing to the parties for hay purchased by Les Whitney
in 1993 is awarded to the defendant with a value set at $344.00.
7. (Item # 10) The clinic building located in Milford, Utah is awarded to the
defendant with a value set at $6,000.00.
8. (Item # 13) The parties interest in the NADA grazing rights, water rights and
improvements is divided equally between the parties. The defendant is awarded 1/4
undivided interest in NADA as was the plaintiff.
9. (Item #17) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of the water rights owned by the
parties, except that if the domestic water right is incapable of division, that water right
is awarded to the plaintiff for her use of the Kirk Farm and 1/2 of the value of that right
is to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendant to compensate him for that right.
10. (Item # 21) The Goodwin Farm Lease, which has 30 years to run, is awarded
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to the defendant. The Court fixes the value of that lease at $3,000.00 per year X 30
years, which equals a total current value of $90,000.00.
11. (Items # 25 & 27) The horse Rosebud and her colt are awarded to the
defendant with a value fixed at $1,000.00 for both animals.
12. (Item # 26) The horse Misty is awarded to the defendant with a value set at
$900.00.
13. (Items # 32, 33 and 34) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of the cows as
previously stated under the award to the plaintiff.
14.

(Item # 36)

The polled hereford and 2 herefords are awarded to the

defendant at the agreed upon value of $3,000.00.
15. (Item # 37) The hay wagon is awarded to the value with a value set at
$6,500.00.
16. (Item # 38) The 4020 John Deere Tractor is awarded to the defendant with
a value set at $6,000.00.
17. (Item # 39) The New Holland Baler is awarded to the defendant with a value
set at $8,500.00.
18. (Item # 40) The sprayer is awarded to the defendant at the agreed value of
$500.00.
19. (Item # 41) The corrugator is awarded to the defendant with an agreed upon
value of $300.00.
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20. (Item # 42) The scraper is awarded to the defendant with a value set at
$325.00.
21. (Item # 45) The 10,000 gallon fuel tank is awarded to the defendant with a
value set at $1,500.00.
22. (Item # 47) The defendant is awarded the 4 cylinder ruined engine. No
value is fixed at it is of equal value of the 6 cylinder engine awarded to the plaintiff.
23. (Item # 49) The defendant is awarded the portable welder with a value fixed
at $300.00.
24. (Item # 54) The defendant is awarded the miscellaneous power and hand
tools. The value is set at $3,000.00, partially in recognition of the fact that the defendant
owned some of the tools prior to the marriage. The exact division is impossible to
determine given the state of the evidence.
25. (Item # 60) The Trailway Bike is awarded to the defendant with a value set
at $1,000.00.
26. (Item # 73) A used refrigerator is awarded to the defendant with a value set
at $50.00.
27. (Item # 74) One small woman's saddle is awarded to the defendant with a
value set at $600.00.
28. (Item # 102) The food dryer is awarded to the defendant with a value set at
$50.00.
18
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29. (Item #131) The defendant's jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff is to
be returned to him. No value is fixed for the jewelry as it appears that it was a gift and
is the defendant's separate property.
30. (Item # 132) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of all CD's and cassettes in the
possession of the parties. If necessary the Court will hold a hearing to effectuate an
equitable distribution of those items.
31. (Item # 135) The defendant is awarded the 8 handmade quilts with a value
of $100.00 per quilt for a total value of $800.00.
32. (Item #136) The defendant is awarded the four western hats with a value
of $100.00 per hat for a total value of $400.00.
33. (Item # 137) The defendant is awarded the silver belt buckle with a value
fixed at $100.00.
34. (Item # 138) The defendant is awarded the 6 hunting knives with a value of
$100.00 per knife for a total of $600.00.
35. (Item # 139) The defendant is awarded the weight bench and the various
barbells and dumbbells with a value set at $200.00 total.
36. (Item # 141) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of the poles possessed by the
parties at the time of the trial in this case.
37. (Item # 142) the defendant is awarded the trailer which now carries the
plaintiffs grain barrel. The value of the trailer is fixed at $200.00.
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38. (Item # 143) The defendant is awarded 1/2 of the net wire which the parties
possessed at the time of the trial in this matter.
39. (Item # 145) The defendant is awarded the Marquette torch. No value is
fixed since it is considered of equal value with the torch awarded to the plaintiff.
40. (Item # 157) The defendant is awarded the 2nd post hole digger with a value
fixed at $200.00.
41. (Item # 163) The defendant is awarded the 1991 Ford Diesel Pickup Truck
with a value fixed at $12,500.00.
42. (Item # 170) The defendant is awarded the various utensils and dishes on
the Cow Hollow property with a value not fixed since there was no value proven.
43. (Item #171) The defendant is awarded the work table in the plaintiffs garage
which is not currently being used by Seth and Sheb for their reloading activities. No
value is fixed since the table is deemed to be of equal value to the one awarded to the
plaintiff.
The total value of the marital property awarded to the plaintiff is $121,450.00. The
total value of the marital property awarded to the defendant is $147,069.00.
PROPERTY NOT AWARDED
The Court will next list those items which were discussed in argument by the
parties but which the Court determined were not marital property and were not subject
to award to either party.
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1. A horse called Little Red. The evidence demonstrates that this horse actually
belongs to Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the parties.
2. A horse called Copper.

The evidence now demonstrates that Copper is

deceased.
3. A horse acquired in 1993. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the horse
in fact belongs to the plaintiffs father and not to the parties.
4. A horse acquired in 1994. The evidence is clear that this horse is the plaintiffs
property by gift from her sons and a gentleman admirer.
5. The parties are not entitled to claim cows owned by other persons, including
their children.
6. A 1986 F-250 Pickup Truck which the evidence demonstrates is owned by
Glade Nicholson, a friend of the. plaintiff..
7. A 1985 Mercury which the defendant originally claimed was a marital asset but
which has not been proven to exist.
8. A 125 cc Yamaha Motorcycle which the evidence shows is owned in fact by
Sheb and Seth, the parties' minor children.
9. A 50 cc Suzuki Moped which the evidence indicates is owned by Codi Davie
Lofland.
10. A Yamaha 4-Wheel ATV which likewise belongs to Codi.
11. A 4-horse Fifth Wheel Trailer which does not belong to the parties but which
21

the evidence belongs to one Robbie Eyre.
12. A man's saddle located at the plaintiffs house which the evidence shows
belongs to Glade Nicholson.
13. Family recreation equipment. The defendant claims that there is various
family recreational equipment belonging to the parties.

The plaintiff disputes the

existence of that equipment. The Court is unable to determine whether that equipment
exists. If in fact it exists it should be awarded to the plaintiff for the children's use. No
value is fixed.
14. The defendant claims that there is a riding mower which is part of the marital
estate. The Court has received no evidence to prove that such a mower exists. It is
disputed by the plaintiff. The riding, mower is:not awarded.
15. The defendant claimed the existence of several hope chests which he said
belonged to the parties. The Court is convinced that one of the hope chests in question
belongs to Christie, a daughter. The other hope chests were not proven to exist and
therefore are not awarded.
16. A second set of bunkbeds. The defendant claimed the existence of a second
set of bunkbeds. The plaintiff disputes the existence of that set of beds. The Court finds
that the existence of the beds has not been proven and therefore they are not awarded.
17. The same applies to two additional food dryers which are not awarded.
18. The same applies to a third guitar which is not awarded.
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19. The Court finds that the two saxophones belong to Seth and Sheb, the two
minor children of the parties.
20. Likewise the two guitars in the possession of the plaintiff belong to Seth and
Sheb, the minor children of the parties.
21. Additional 13-inch TV's. The parties apparently now agree that although
there were additional 13-inch TV's in the possession of the parties they are no longer
existent and therefore they are not awarded other than as set forth above.
21. The parties and the children each own various pieces of horse tack. Each
is awarded his or her own tack. If the parties are unable to determine who owns what
tack, the Court will convene a hearing for purposes of making those awards upon proper
notice from either party.
22. A trailer located on the Goodwin Farm clearly belongs to Rosemary Bowman
and not to either of the parties.
23. A saddle stand made by the defendant and given to Seth and Sheb belongs
to the two children of the parties.
DEBTS AND FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS
In view of the division of property arrived at by the Court, and considering the
nature of the obligations which the parties owe, the Court affixes the responsibility for
repayment of debt as suggested by plaintiff in her original argument entitled Summary
of Positions of the Parties and Argument. Although that assessment of the debt requires
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the defendant to pay more than the plaintiff, in view of the fact that the defendant
received more of the property, that division seems appropriate.
ATTORNEY FEES
Plaintiff has sought an award of Attorney Fees against defendant. This case has
been long and bitter. However the Court is unable to determine with precision where the
fault lies for this situation. The Court does find that both parties have been awarded
considerable assets, both are able to work and meet their financial needs and both have
incurred extensive attorney fees. The Court sees no basis for requiring the defendant
to pay the plaintiffs attorney. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own attorney fees.
COSTS
Costs are awarded to the plaintiff as the prevailing party.
INJUNCTION
The permanent injunction sought by the plaintiff is granted as prayed in plaintiffs
opening written argument.
The counsel for the plaintiff is ordered to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law as well as a Decree of Divorce setting out the content of this
Decision as well as those items otherwise agreed upon by the parties. Once those
documents have been prepared they should be forwarded to defendant's counsel for
review before being submitted to the Court for signature. If there are other items which
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the Court has overlooked, and which need attention, either party may call those matters
to the Court's attention at the Court's next law & motion day upon prior notice to the
other side.
DATED this

15!zL

day of June, 1995.

J. PPRUPEEVES
Ftfm District Court /udge

Signature Affixed at Direction of District Judge.
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Mailing Certificate
I hereby certify that on this /%1ZL day of June, 1995, I mailed true and correct
copies of the above and foregoing Memorandum Decision, first-class postage prepaid,
to the following counsel of record:

Willard R. Bishop, Esq.
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279

J. Bruce Reading, Esq.
261 East 300 South
Suite #200
Salt Lake City, UT84111

Court Adrmnistrative Executive
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Addendum

9I

B":

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Dated
December 21, 1995

IF Hill!)
DEC 211995
C!3rt

WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE,

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

CRAIG VERNON DAVIE,

)
)
)

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 94-CV-29
Honorable J. Philip Eves

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the Court on January 10 and
11, 1995, in connection with all issues extant in the case, as set forth in the Pretrial Order.
Plaintiff JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE appeared personally and was represented by her
attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Defendant CRAIG VERNON DAVIE also
appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. J. Bruce Reading.
Following the completion of presentation of evidence on the second day of trial, the parties
and the Court determined it would be appropriate to submit arguments in writing. The
schedule for submission of the arguments was set and the Court took the matter under
submission pending the filing of the arguments. Thereafter, on May 23, 1995, Plaintiff filed

a document entitled "Notice of Readiness for Decision". The Court having reviewed the
written submissions of the parties, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence, now
makes and enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Jurisdiction and Grounds for Divorce
1.

Both Plaintiff and Defendant are actual, bona fide residents of Beaver County,

State of Utah, and were such for more than three months immediately prior to the
commencement of this action.
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant are wife and husband, having married on March 3,

1978, in Minersville, Beaver County, State of Utah.
3.

Irreconcilable differences have arisen between the parties to the point that it

is impossible for Plaintiff to continue the marriage relationship with Defendant.
Custody Matters
4.

As issue of their marriage, and as a result of adoption of Plaintiffs children

by a prior marriage, the parties are parents of the following children:
A.

Christi Dawn Davie Weldert, a daughter, born September 30, 1968,

now married and 26 years of age.
B.

Codi Ann Davie Lofland, a daughter, born May 19, 1970, now married

and 25 years of age.
C.

Seth Craig Davie, a son, born November 18, 1979, now 15 years of age.

D.

Sheb Eugene Davie, a son, born November 18, 1979, now 15 years of

age.
No other children have been born to the parties and no other children are expected.
5.

Plaintiff seeks custody of the parties' two minor children, Sheb and Seth

Davie. The boys are now 15 years of age, as set forth above. Defendant Craig Vernon
Davie, on the other hand, agrees that Plaintiff should be the physical custodian of the
children, but seeks an award of joint legal custody.
6.

UCA 30-3-10.2 (1953, as amended), sets out the factors for the Court to

consider in determining whether or not a joint legal custody is appropriate. That statute
provides as follows:
"1. The court may order joint legal custody if it determines that
joint legal custody is in the best interest of the child and: (a)
both parents agree to an order of joint legal custody; or (b)
both parents appear capable of implementing joint legal
custody."
7.

During the course of these proceedings, the parties have exhibited intense

hostility and lack of cooperation towards each other. The parties have not agreed to an
order of joint legal custody, and the Court finds that the parties are not capable of
implementing a joint custody order as they are unable to cooperate in any aspect of their
dealings.
8.

It is not in the best interests of Seth Craig Davie and Sheb Eugene Davie to

place them in a joint legal custody situation.
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9.

Plaintiff has been and still is, the primary caretaker of the parties' minor

children. The best interest of the minor children would be served by awarding their care,
custody, and control to Plaintiff Jetta Ann Pearson Davie.
Visitation
10.

The minor children of the parties are substantially engaged in work, school

activities, and extra-curricular activities.
11.

It is not appropriate for the minor children to visit in the home of Defendant

when Grace McFall and her two children are spending the night there. Both Sheb and Seth
Davie have expressed discomfort with visiting overnight when their father is entertaining Ms.
McFall overnight. That situation should be avoided.
12.

It is appropriate that Defendant be awarded reasonable rights of visitation as

provided in UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as amended), and such other liberal and reasonable
visitation as may be worked out between the parties in advance, said visitation to be
conditioned upon Defendant's compliance with the following conditions:
A.

Visitation is to be arranged so that it does not unnecessarily or

unreasonably interfere with the school work and work activities of the boys.
B.

Defendant's right to overnight visitation should be conditioned upon

providing suitable living quarters for the boys during the visit. It is not appropriate
for the boys to visit in the home of Defendant when Grace McFall and her two
children are spending the night there.
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Child Support
13.

Defendant has the capacity to earn income at the rate of $1,500.00 per month.

Defendant testified that he does not earn that much, but the Court finds that he is capable
of earning that much and should impute that amount to him as earning ability.
14.

The Court finds that Plaintiff has the ability to earn income in the amount of

$1,000.00 per month.
15.

Using the income figures set forth above, Plaintiff has a gross monthly income,

or capability to earn the same, of $1,000.00. Defendant has a gross monthly income, or the
capability to earn the same, of $1,500.00 per month. The adjusted gross income for child
support purposes, therefore, comes to $2,500.00 per month. Using the applicable guidelines,
the base combined support obligation of both parties is $641.00 per month. Plaintiffs share
of the base combined support obligation is 40%, or $256.40 per month, which will be met
by having the children in her home. Defendant's 60% share of the base combined support
obligation is $384.60 per month, which Defendant should be required to pay to Plaintiff.
Because of the ages and abilities of the minor sons of the parties, work-related child care
costs are not applicable. To the extent that either party pays medical, dental, and optical
insurance premiums for insurance covering the parties' minor children, that portion of the
premium which goes to pay for the children's coverage should be divided and apportioned
between the parties equally, share and share alike. In the event that the children visit with
Defendant for more than 25 of 30 consecutive days in the summertime for extended
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visitation, then the base support award for each child will be reduced by 50% for that period
of time. Since the base child support award to be paid by Defendant to Plaintiff is $384.60
per month, that works out to an individual award of $192.30 per month per child. Said
child support should be paid until such time as the children reach their age of majority or
complete high school, whichever occurs later, from and after January 11,1995. Withholding
should be required in accordance with applicable law.
Medical and Dental Insurance
16.

Plaintiff should be required to maintain medical, dental and optical insurance

coverage for the benefit of the parties' minor children when such is available at reasonable
cost. Premiums applicable to the children's coverage should be shared equally by the
parties, as should medical, dental, and optical expenses for the children which are not
covered by insurance.
Tax Deductions
17.

The parties could benefit equally from use of the minor children as deductions

for state and federal income tax purposes. As a result, it is fair, equitable, and reasonable
that each party be permitted to claim one of the children as a dependent for state and
federal income tax purposes.
No Alimony
18.

Neither party requested alimony. Both parties are healthy, able-bodied adults

and are capable of generating their own support. It is appropriate that no alimony be
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awarded to either party, provided, however, that it is fair, equitable, and reasonable that
Defendant be required to assume and pay debts which the Court will assign to him
hereafter, in lieu of alimony, since Plaintiff will not be able to support herself if required
to pay the debts assigned to Defendant
Division of Assets
Plaintiffs Separate Property
19.

It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as her sole and

separate property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the items listed below which
were and are her premarital property. No value is assigned to the items of premarital
property awarded to Plaintiff for the reason that their value is irrelevant, those items not
being subject to a division between the parties.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
0.
P.
Q.

250 cc Honda motorcycle
175 cc Kawasaki/Yamaha motorcycle
Rototiller
Antique sewing machine
Newer sewing machine
Hope chest from the master bedroom
Bunk bed
Single bed
Full bed
Double bed
Bosch bread machine
Wheat grinder
Piano
Electric key board
Small color television with doors
Stereo
White tin shed
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R.
S.
T.
U.
V.
W.
X.

Couch and loveseat
Rocking chair
One meat saw
1974 Ford truck
Plaintiffs personal items stored in the railroad building
Plaintiffs personal items and premarital property stored in the rafter
of the garage.
Plaintiffs Wedding ring set
Defendant's Separate Property

20.

It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Defendant be awarded as his sole and

separate property, free and clear of any claim of Plaintiff, the items set forth below, which
were and are his premarital property. No value is assigned to these items for the reason
that their value is irrelevant, they not being subject to a division between the parties.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
L
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
O.
P.
Q.
R.

All interest in Cow Hollow property
Fuel tank and stand
Portable welder
Banker's Life Annuity
Paul Revere Annuity
Woodburning stove
Tool chest
Acetylene tanks and carrier
One meat saw
Flatbed trailer
1972 Ford truck, which Defendant should be ordered to remove from
Plaintiffs property.
350 cc Honda motorcycle
1961 stock truck
Antique watch and case
Motor manuals
Fire extinguisher in garage
Leica 35mm camera
Collection of purple bottles
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S.

21.

T.

His scrap books and pictures, provided, however, that Plaintiff should
be permitted to obtain copies for herself, should she so desire.
Defendant's premarital property stored in the rafters of the garage,
together with such personal items as may belong to him in that
storage.

U.

The red chain saw

The Court specifically finds that the Cow Hollow property is separate,

premarital property of the Defendant. Plaintiff argued that she acquired marital property
rights by virtue of her labor on the property through the years of the marriage. However,
the Court finds that Plaintiff enjoyed the use of the property along with the rest of the
family and as part of that use, participated in maintenance and improvements. The labors
performed by Plaintiff on the Cow Hollow property were not inconsistent with the family
use of the property and created no marital property right in Plaintiff. Where there has been
no gift, and no commingling so as to convert a clear piece of separate property to a marital
asset, the property remains separate.
Plaintiff's Marital Property
22.

It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Plaintiff be awarded as her sole and

separate property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the following items of marital
property:
A.

One-half interest in the Western Rock lease of water from a windmill
at the 13-Mile/Kirk Farm, and a site upon which Western Rock keeps
its batch plant. Lease payments from this lease are to be paid directly
to Dr. Prince for the orthodontic care of the parties' minor children.
After Dr. prince is paid off, the remaining balance of the Western
Rock payments are to be equally divided between the parties. The
9

Court affixes no value to this award since it is impossible to determine
what the actual value of the lease will be after Dr. Prince has been
paid, and for the further reason that there is no need to set a value
upon the interest here awarded, since it will be divided equally
between the parties.
The $150.00 already received by Plaintiff from the sale of hay to
Mildred Loveridge. Defendant has also received $150.00 from that
source.
The family home located in Minersville, Beaver County, State of Utah,
more specifically described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 31, Plat "B",
Minersville Town Survey, and running thence North 9 rods; thence
North 51*30' East 3.2 rods; thence South 1.2 rods; thence North
60*53' East 4.82 rods; thence South 11.53 rods; thence West 7 rods to
the point of beginning. Together with all rights, privileges,
improvements, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or any wise
appertaining.
The Court finds that the home belonged to Plaintiff prior to her
marriage to Defendant. The Court further finds that Defendant made
significant contributions to the home in terms of a lump sum
contribution as well as payments towards loan obligations. The Court
heard evidence from Plaintiff that the current value of her home is
$51,000.00. The Court also heard evidence from an appraiser that the
current value is $78,000.00. The appraiser did admit that he was
unable to find comparable sales in the Minersville area and used
comparable sales from Beaver to establish his value. He also admitted
that there were certain repairs and extensive termite damage that he
had not considered in arriving at his value. The Court is of the
opinion that the fair market value is closer to the $51,000.00 testified
to by the Plaintiff rather than the $78,000.00 testified to by the
appraiser. Accordingly, the Court fixes the current value of the home
at $51,000.00. The parties testified that there are currently liens
totaling $19,850.00 against the home, consisting of $14,700.00 owed to
Rosemary Bowman and $5,150.00 owed to Plaintiffs parents. Thus,
the current equity in the home is $31,150.00. Plaintiff argued that
10

some amount of the equity should be awarded to her as premarital in
view of the fact that she owned the home for several years prior to her
marriage to Defendant The Court is unable, however, to determine
from the testimony presented what portion of the equity accrued prior
to the marriage and portion accrued since March of 1978, when the
parties were married. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant
have made various contributions to the home from both marital and
separate funds. The Court cannot determine by a preponderance of
the evidence the exact nature or amount of the contributions.
Therefore, the Court finds that because of commingling, the equity in
the home is to be treated as marital property in total. Therefore, the
Court finds the home should be awarded to Plaintiff, but fixes the
value of that award at the total of the equity in the amount of
$31,150.00.
The newspaper building located in Milford, Beaver County, Utah, with
a value of $6,000.00, which property is more specifically described as
follows:
Beginning at a point of West boundary line of Lot 4, said point being
175.35 feet from Northwest corner of Block 10, Plat "B", Milford Town
Survey, thence South 80*07 East 69.41 feet; thence South 24*55' West
32.77 feet; thence North 80*07 West 61.04 feet; thence North 9*53'
East 31.65 feet to beginning. Together with all rights, privileges, and
appurtenances thereunto belonging.
The Mineral Range grazing rights/AUMS, with a value of $8,000.00,
specifically described as being and including:
(1)

Share Certificate No. 209, including 23 one and one-half shares
of common stock of the North Divide Grazing Company.

(2)

Mineral Range AUMS, described as follows:
Including, but not limited to, 36 AUMS, as evidenced by
Minersville No. 6104 and 121 AUMS as evidenced by Mineral
Range No. 6107, and including 112 AUMS suspended non-use.
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F.

A one-fourth (Vi) undivided interest in and to all NADA lands, BLM
grazing rights, the State land lease, NADA Corporation stock,
associated water rights and improvements. The land included in
NADA is located in Iron County, State of Utah, and is more
specifically described as follows:
(1)

Parcel 1: The South quarter of Section 3, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(2)

Parcel 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, and the South one-half of
Section 4, all in Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(3)

Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12, all in Section
5, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.

(4)

Parcel 4: Lots 1, 2, and 4, all in Section 6, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(5)

Parcel 5: The West one-half; and the South one-half of the
Southeast quarter, both in Section 8, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(6)

Parcel 6: The Southeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the
Southwest quarter; and the South half of the Southwest quarter,
all in Section 9, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(7)

Parcel 7: The Northeast one-quarter; the East one-half of the
Northwest one-quarter; and the North one-half of the Southeast
one-quarter, all in Section 30, Township 31 South, Range 12
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(8)

Parcel 8: The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the
North one-half of the Southwest one-quarter; the Southwest
one-quarter of the Southwest one-quarter; all in Section 1,
Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
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9)

Parcel 9: The North one-half of Section 12, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

10)

Parcel 10: The West one-half of Section 15, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

11)

Parcel 11: The West one-half of Section 22, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

12)

Parcel 12: The West one-half of Section 23, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

13)

Parcel 13: The West one-half of Section 26, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

14)

Parcel 14: The Northeast one-quarter of Section 33, Township
31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

15)

Parcel 15: The Southeast one-quarter of Section 28, Township
31 South, range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

16)

Parcel 16: The West one-half of Section 2, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

17)

Parcel 17: The West one-half of Section 3, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

18)

Parcel 18: The Southwest one-quarter of Section 11, Township
32 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

19)

Parcel 19: The Northeast one-quarter and the North 23 acres
of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 10, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including, but not limited to,
374 AUMS formerly belonging to Rosemary G. D. Bowman,
who took title as Rosemary G. Davie, in the NADA BLM
allotment.
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TOGETHER WITH WUC No. 71-1450, 71-1451, 71-1698, 711713, 71-1723, and 71-1724, and any and all other water rights
pertaining thereunto.
TOGETHER WITH all interest in State of Utah Grazing Lease
No. 20730, and any subsequent State of Utah Grazing Leases.
TOGETHER WITH all oil and mineral and geothermal rights,
together with the right of ingress and egress for mining,
exploring, and/or removing the same.
(20)

The State of Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry
Grazing Permit No. GP-20730, containing 102 AUMS, more or
less, covering 2,898.24 acres, more or less, of land owned by the
State of Utah, consisting of Sections 16 and 32 in Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
including all of Sections 32 and 36, and the West half of
Section 21, in Township 31 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(21)

All windmills,
improvements.

(22)

All ownership interest in NADA, whether manifested by share
certificates or otherwise.

water

right improvements,

and

other

The Kirk/13-Mile Farm, with a value established at $40,000.00, located
in Beaver County, Utah, and more specifically described as follows:
(1)

Parcel 1: Lot 2 and the Southwest quarter of the Northeast
quarter of Section 5, Township 30 South, Range 11 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.

(2)

Parcel 2: Lots 1, 2, and 3; the South half of the Northeast
quarter and the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of
Section 4, Township 30 South, Range 11 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian.
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(3)

Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the South half of the North
half of Section 3, Township 30 South, Range 11, West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including but not limited to,
36 AUMS as evidenced by Minersville No. 6104 and 121
AUMS as evidence by Mineral Range No. 6107, and 112
AUMS suspended non-use.
SUBJECT TO a life estate in Rosemary Davie Bowman in and
to all geothermal rights, together with the right of ingress and
egress for the purpose of exploring and/or removing the same.
TOGETHER WITH all rights, privileges, improvements, and
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining
thereunto.

(4)

Parcel 4: Beginning at the South quarter corner of Section 33,
Township 29 South, Range 11 West, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian; thence Westerly along the section line to a point 160
feet West of the South quarter corner of said Section 33;
thence North 160 feet; thence East 160 feet to the center
section line of said Section 33; thence South 160 feet along the
section center line to the point of beginning.

H.

An undivided one-half interest in and to the water rights owned by the
parties, as evidenced by WUC 71-1650 and 20105, containing 116.02
acre feet of water, including 25.4 acre feet of water for irrigation, stock
watering equivalent for 500 units (14 acre feet), and one domestic
right, approximately .045 acre feet. In the event that the domestic
water right cannot be divided, it should be awarded to Plaintiff to be
used with the Kirk Farm, and one-half of the value of that right should
be paid by Plaintiff to the Defendant as compensation.

I.

As indicated above, the Minersville Range AUMS should be awarded
to Plaintiff. The value of those grazing rights is fixed at $1,350.00.
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J.

The gravel pit on the Kirk Farm should be awarded to Plaintiff. The
value of the gravel pit is included in the $40,000.00 value assigned to
the Kirk/13-Mile Farm, above.

K.

The 13-Mile Farm lease should be awarded to Plaintiff with a value of
$3,900.00.

L.

The horse named "Splash" with a value fixed in the amount of $700.00.
If the horse is not returned to Plaintiff by Defendant within 30 days
after the judgment to be entered hereafter is entered, Defendant
should be required to pay Plaintiff the cash equivalent of the value of
the horse.

M.

The horse named "Blondie" with a value set in the amount of $700.00.
The horse should be returned to Plaintiff by Defendant within 30 days
of the entry of judgment herein. If the horse is not returned to
Plaintiff within 30 days, Defendant should be required to pay to
Plaintiff the cash equivalent of the value of the horse.

N.

One-half of all cattle owned by the parties, not previously sold or
divided. Plaintiff should be required to prepare two (2) lists of what
she perceives to be an equal division of such cattle and calves.
Defendant should then be allowed to choose which list he prefers, and
upon this basis the previously undivided cattle and calves should be
distributed.

O.

Because of the circumstances in this case, in the event that either
Plaintiff or Defendant is found to have take more than his or her fair
share of cows, or to have secreted cows from the other party, the
Court, following hearing, should enter an order requiring the offending
party to pay to the other party double the value of the cows secreted.

P.

The Angus and Hereford bulls at the agreed value of $2,000.00.

Q.

The John Deere bailer at the value of $2,500.00.

R.

The John Deere 2280 swather at the value of $10,000.00.
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S.

The six-cylinder ruined engine should be awarded to Plaintiff, and the
four-cylinder engine should be awarded to Defendant. No value is set
for these items, their values being deemed equal by the Court.

T.

The stationary welder at the value of $300.00.

U.

The John Deere chain saw with a value of $300.00.

V.

The air compressor and air tank with a total value for both pieces of
$250.00.

W.

The various remaining farm tools consisting of shovels, rakes, hoes,
pitch forks, etc., with a value set at $200.00.

X.

The 1979 Ford Courier pickup, with a value of $500.00.

Y.

The 1973 Mercury, with a value of $50.00.

Z.

The four-horse trailer, with a value of $1,000.00.

AA.

Her Utah State Retirement Fund Account, with a value of $1,400.00.

AB.

The used freezer in her home, with a value of $100.00.

AC.

The two, used refrigerators found on Plaintiffs property, with a value
of $100.00 for both pieces.

AD.

The four-drawer filing cabinet located in Plaintiffs home. No value
is affixed to this item in view of the fact that the metal filing cabinet
of equal value is going to be awarded to Defendant.

AE.

Two lawn mowers, with value set at $100.00 each, for a total value of
$200.00.

AF.

The prefabricated saddle stand, with a value of $50.00.

AG.

The washer and dryer, with a value of $600.00 for both pieces.

AH.

The microwave oven, with a value of $100.00.
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AI.

The dishwasher, with the agreed value of $200.00.

AJ.

The organ which is located in the family home. Its value is set at
$600.00 in recognition of the fact that the organ was at least partially
paid for prior to the marriage of the parties.

AK.

The small color television set, value $50.00.

AL.

The home computer, printer and programs with a value of $500.00.

AM. The video cassette recorder with a value of $50.00.
AN.

The various VCR tapes in Plaintiffs home, with a set value of $300.00,
provided, however, that Defendant should be allowed to copy any
noncommercial tapes that he chooses.

AO.

The camcorder, with a value of $100.00.

AP.

The stereo cabinet, with a value of $50.00.

AQ.

The almond-colored tin shed which is on a slab located on the real
estate surrounding the home. The value of this item has been
included in the value of the home, already fixed by the Court.

AR.

The kitchen utensils and luxury appliances, including the fire
extinguisher in the kitchen, with a value of $50.00.

AS.

The couch in the basement of the marital home, with a value of
$200.00.

AT.

One-half of all compact discs and cassettes owned by the parties at the
time of their separation. The other one-half of the compact discs and
cassettes should be awarded to Defendant. The parties are to divide
the cassettes and compact discs equally between them. If they are not
able to do so, the Court should conduct a hearing for making the
division upon notice to both sides.

AU.

The kitchen table and chairs, with value of $250.00.
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AV.

The pictures, knick-knacks, clocks, collectibles and porcelain figures,
etc., with the value of $1,000.00.

AW. The posthole digger which was the purchased by the parties, with a
value of $200.00.
AX.

One-half of the poles owned by the parties at the time of trial, with
Defendant receiving the other one-half.

AY.

The grain barrel, not including the trailer, with a value of $200.00.

AZ.

One-half of the net wire owned by the parties at the time of trial, with
Defendant receiving the other one-half.

BA.

The acetylene torch now in her possession. No value is affixed by the
Court since the Marquette torch is awarded to the Defendant and the
Court deems the two torches of equal value.

BB.

The 35mm Canon camera, with value of $100.00.

BC.

Her wedding ring set. The set was a gift to her during the marriage.
No value is set because it is her separate property.

BD.

The 1990 Dodge Dynasty, with value of $6,000.00.

BE.

Her own scrap books and pictures. Defendant should likewise be
awarded his own scrap books and pictures. Each party should be
authorized to obtain copies of any photographs retained by the other
party.

BF.

The two work tables should be divided between the parties. Plaintiff
should be awarded the table which Sheb and Seth Davie are currently
using for their reloading equipment. Defendant should be awarded
the other table. No value is set for the reason that the Court deems
the tables to be of equal value.
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Defendant's Marital Property
23.

Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate property, free and clear

of any claim of Plaintiff, the following items of marital property:
A.

The obligation owed to the parties by Ray Barnes, with the value of
$375.00.

B.

The balance owed by Warren Gray for a hay purchase in 1993, with a
value of $750.00.

C.

The balance owed to the parties for hay purchases by Mark Thompson
in 1993, with a value of $475.00.

D.

The amount of $150.00 already received by Defendant from Mildred
Loveridge for a hay purchase.

E.

The balance owing from Beaver County for gravel purchased from the
13-Mile/Kirk Farm, with a value of $400.00.

F.

The balance owing to the parties for hay purchased by Les Whitney in
1993, with a value of $344.00.

G.

The clinic building located in Milford, Beaver County, Utah, with a
value set at $6,000.00, which clinic building is more specifically
described as follows:
Commencing at a point on Westerly sideline of Lot 4 from which the
Northwest corner of said Block 10, Plat "B", Milford Town Survey,
bears North 9*53' East 207 feet South 80*07 East 61.04 feet to a
point on Westerly line of railroad right-of-way; thence South 24° 55'
West 37.95 feet; thence North 80*07' West 51.2 feet to a point on
Easterly line of Main Street from which point the Southern extremity
of Lot 4 bears South 9*53' West 190.61 feet; thence North 9*53' East
along East line of Main Street 36.65 feet to beginning. Together with
all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging.
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H.

An undivided one-quarter interest in all NADA property, water rights,
improvements, shares, or ownership, thus resulting in an equal division
of all NADA interests between the parties. Legal descriptions of the
properties are more specifically described as follows:
(1)

Parcel 1: The South quarter of Section 3, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(2)

Parcel 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, and the South one-half of
Section 4, all in Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(3)

Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12, all in Section
5, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.

(4)

Parcel 4: Lots 1, 2, and 4, all in Section 6, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(5)

Parcel 5: The West one-half; and the South one-half of the
Southeast quarter, both in Section 8, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(6)

Parcel 6: The Southeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the
Southwest quarter; and the South half of the Southwest quarter,
all in Section 9, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(7)

Parcel 7: The Northeast one-quarter; the East one-half of the
Northwest one-quarter; and the North one-half of the Southeast
one-quarter, all in Section 30, Township 31 South, Range 12
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(8)

Parcel 8: The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the
North one-half of the Southwest one-quarter; the Southwest
one-quarter of the Southwest one-quarter; all in Section 1,
Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.
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Parcel 9: The North one-half of Section 12, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 10: The West one-half of Section 15, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 11: The West one-half of Section 22, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 12: The West one-half of Section 23, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 13: The West one-half of Section 26, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 14: The Northeast one-quarter of Section 33, Township
31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 15: The Southeast one-quarter of Section 28, Township
31 South, range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 16: The West one-half of Section 2, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 17: The West one-half of Section 3, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 18: The Southwest one-quarter of Section 11, Township
32 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Parcel 19: The Northeast one-quarter and the North 23 acres
of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 10, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including, but not limited to,
374 AUMS formerly belonging to Rosemary G. D. Bowman,
who took title as Rosemary G. Davie, in the NADA BLM
allotment.
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TOGETHER WITH WUC No. 71-1450, 71-1451, 71-1698, 711713, 71-1723, and 71-1724, and any and all other water rights
pertaining thereunto.
TOGETHER WITH all interest in State of Utah Grazing Lease
No. 20730, and any subsequent State of Utah Grazing Leases.
TOGETHER WITH all oil and mineral and geothermal rights,
together with the right of ingress and egress for mining,
exploring, and/or removing the same.
(20)

The State of Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry
Grazing Permit No. GP-20730, containing 102 AUMS, more or
less, covering 2,898.24 acres, more or less, of land owned by the
State of Utah, consisting of Sections 16 and 32 in Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
including all of Sections 32 and 36, and the West half of
Section 21, in Township 31 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(21)

All windmills, water
improvements.

(22)

All ownership interest in NADA, whether manifested by share
certificates or otherwise.

right improvements,

and

other

I.

One-half of the water rights owned by the parties, as set forth in
paragraph 22H, above, except that if the domestic water right is
incapable of division, that water right should be awarded to Plaintiff
for her use on the Kirk Farm and one-half of the value of that right
is to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant to compensate him for
that right.

J.

The Goodwin Farm Lease, which has 30 years to run, for a total
current value of $90,000.00. Plaintiff contributed significantly to the
rehabilitation and improvement of the farm ground and irrigation
system subject to the lease, to the point that the value of the leasehold
interest constitutes marital property.
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K.

The horse "Rosebud" and her colt, with a value of $1,000.00 for both
animals.

L.

The horse "Misty" with a value of $900.00.

M.

One-half of the cows, as previously stated in paragraph 22N, above,
concerning the award to Plaintiff.

N.

The polled Hereford bull and two, horned Hereford bulls, at the
agreed upon value of $3,000.00.

O.

The hay wagon, with the value of $6,500.00.

P.

The 4020 John Deere tractor, with a value of $6,000.00.

Q.

The New Holland baler, with value of $8,500.00.

R.

The sprayer, valued at $500.00.

S.

The corrugator, with an agreed upon value of $300.00.

T.

The scraper, with value set at $325.00.

U.

The 10,000 gallon fuel tank, with value of $1,500.00.

V.

The four-cylinder ruined engine. No value is fixed, for the reason that
it is the same value as the six-cylinder engine to be awarded to
Plaintiff.

W.

The portable welder, with value of $300.00.

X.

The miscellaneous power and hand tools, with value set at $3,000.00,
partially in recognition of the fact that Defendant owned some of the
tools prior to the marriage. The exact division is impossible to
determine given the state of the evidence.

Y.

The Trailway bike, valued at $1,000.00.

Z.

A used refrigerator, valued at $50.00.
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AA.

One small woman's saddle, valued at $600.00.

AB.

The food dryer, valued at $50.00.

AC.

His jewelry, if any, in the possession of Plaintiff, which should be
returned to him by Plaintiff. No value is fixed for the jewelry as it
appears that it was a gift and is the Defendant's separate property.

AD.

One-half of all compact discs and cassettes in the possession of the
parties. If necessary, the Court will hold a hearing to effectuate an
equitable distribution of those items.

AE.

Eight handmade quilts, with a value of $100.00 per quilt, for a total
value of $800.00.

AF.

Four western hats with a value of $100.00 per hat, for a total value of
$400.00.

AG.

The silver belt buckle, with a value of $100.00.

AH.

Six hunting knives with a value of $100.00 per knife for a total of
$600.00.

AI.

The weight bench and various barbells and dumbbells, with a value of
$200.00.

AJ.

One-half of the poles possessed by the parties at the time of the trial
in this case.

AK.

The trailer which now carries the Plaintiffs grain barrel. The value of
the trailer is fixed at $200.00.

AL.

One-half of the net chicken wire possessed by the parties at the time
of trial.

AM. The Marquette torch. No value is fixed since it is considered of equal
value to the torch awarded to Plaintiff.
AN.

The second posthole digger, valued at $200.00.
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AO.

The 1991 Ford diesel pickup truck, with value of $12,500.00.

AP.

The various utensils and dishes on the Cow Hollow property, with no
value fixed, since no value was proven.

AQ.

The work table in Plaintiffs garage which is not currently being used
by Seth and Sheb for their reloading activities. No value is affixed by
the Court, since this table is deemed to be of equal value to the one
awarded to Plaintiff.

AR.

The "MC" brand and earmark, upon final distribution of all the cattle.
Value of All Marital Property

24.

The total value of the marital property awarded to Plaintiff is $121,450.00.

The total value of the marital property awarded to Defendant is $147,069.00.
Property Not Awarded
25.

The Court determined that various items of property discussed in argument

by the parties were not marital property, and were not subject to award to either party.
Those items are as follows:
A.

The horse called "Little Red". The evidence demonstrates that this
horse actually belongs to Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the
parties.

B.

A horse called "Copper". The evidence now demonstrates that Copper
is deceased.

C.

A horse acquired in 1993. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the
horse in fact belongs to Plaintiffs father and not to the parties.

D.

A horse acquired in 1994. The evidence is clear that this horse is the
Plaintiffs property by gift from her sons and a gentleman admirer.
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E.

The parties are not entitled to claim cows owned by other persons,
including their children.

F.

A certain 1986 F-250 pickup truck which the evidence demonstrates is
owned by Glade Mickelson, a friend of Plaintiff.

G.

A 1985 Mercury vehicle which the Defendant originally claimed was
a marital asset, but which has not been proven to exist.

H.

A 125 cc Yamaha motorcycle which the evidence shows is owned in
fact by Sheb and Seth, the parties' minor children.

I.

A 50 cc Suzuki moped which the evidence indicates is owned by Codi
Davie Lofland.

J.

A Yamaha 4-wheel ATV which likewise belongs to Codi Davie
Lofland.

K.

A four-horse fifth-wheel trailer which does not belong to the parties
but which the evidence shows belongs to one Robbie Eyre.

L-

A man's saddle located at Plaintiffs house which the evidence shows
belongs to Glade Mickelson.

M.

Family recreation equipment. The Defendant claims that there is
various family recreational equipment belonging to the parties. The
Plaintiff disputes the existence of that equipment. The Court is unable
to determine whether that equipment exists. If it in fact it exists it
should be awarded to the Plaintiff for the children's use. No value is
fixed.

N.

The Defendant claims that there is a riding mower which is part of the
marital estate. The Court has received no evidence to prove that such
a mower exists. It is disputed by the Plaintiff. The riding mower is
not awarded.

O.

The Defendant claimed the existence of several hope chests which he
said belonged to the parties. The Court is convinced that one of the
hope chests in question belongs to Christi Davie Weldert, a daughter.
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The other hope chests were not proven to exist and therefore are not
awarded.
P.

The second set of bunk beds. The Defendant claimed the existence of
a second set of bunk beds. The Plaintiff disputes the existence of that
set of beds. The Court finds that the existence of the beds has not
been proven and therefore, they are not awarded.

Q.

Defendant claimed the existence of two additional food dryers. The
Plaintiff disputed the existence of such additional food dryers. The
Court finds that the existence of the two additional food dryers has not
been proven, and therefore, they are not awarded.

R.

A third guitar. Defendant claimed the existence of a third guitar.
Plaintiff disputed such alleged existence. The Court finds that the
existence of the third guitar has not been proven, and therefore, it is
not awarded.

S.

The Court finds that the two saxophones belong to Seth and Sheb, the
two minor children of the parties.

T.

Likewise, the two guitars in the possession of the Plaintiff belong to
Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the parties.

U.

Additional, 13-inch television sets. The parties apparently now agree
that although there were additional 13-inch television sets in the
possession of the parties, they are no longer existing and therefore, are
not awarded other than as set forth above.

V.

The parties and the children each own various pieces of horse tack.
Each should be awarded his or her own tack. If the parties are unable
to determine who owns what tack, the Court should convene a hearing
for purpose of making those awards upon proper notice from either
party.

W.

A trailer located on the Goodwin Farm clearly belongs to Rosemary
Bowman, and not to either of the parties.
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X.

A saddle stand made by the Defendant and given to Seth and Sheb
belongs to the two children of the parties.
Division of Debts

26.

Based upon the divergent testimony of the parties, with no preponderance

being found, the Court chooses to use Plaintiffs values and evidence pertaining to the
marital debts and obligations by the parties.
Debts Assigned to Plaintiff
27.

It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Plaintiff be required to assume and

pay, and to hold Defendant free and harmless therefrom, the following debts and
obligations of the parties:
A.

The debt owed to Mountain America Credit Union to purchase the
1990 Dodge Dynasty vehicle, approximately $5,200.00.

B.

The debt owed to Rosemary Bowman for the addition to the house,
approximately $14,700.00.

C.

The debt owed to Ralph Pearson in connection with the balance on
the home, approximately $5,150.00.

D.

The debt owed to First Interstate Bank for an operating loan,
approximately $6,279.93.

E.

The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-19, for the
13-Mile Farm and the Goodwin Farm, approximately $43,321.70.

F.

The total of the above debts assigned to Plaintiff comes to
approximately $74,651.63.
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Debts Assigned to Defendant
28.

It is fair, equitable, and reasonable that Defendant be required to assume and

pay, and to hold Plaintiff free and harmless from, the following debts and obligations of the
parties:
A.

The debt owed to First Security Bank to purchase the 1991 Ford diesel
truck, approximately $14,000.00.

B.

The debt owed to SCS and the State of Utah for well and gated pipe
on the Goodwin Farm, approximately $10,957.00.

C.

The debt owed to SCS and the State of Utah for a sprinkler system on
the Goodwin Farm, approximately $13,489.00.

D.

The debt owed to Minersville Feed and Supply, approximately
$16,800.00.

E.

The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-21, for the
13-Mile Farm and Goodwin Farm, in the amount of approximately
$21,194.87, and approximately $2,851.00, respectively.

F.

The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-22, for the
13-Mile and Goodwin Farms, approximately $29,380.58.

G.

The total debt assigned to Defendant comes to approximately
$105,821.45.
Comparison of Debt Assignment

29.

The above assessment of debt requires Defendant to pay more debt than is

required of Plaintiff. In view of the fact that Defendant received a higher value of the
marital property, the division of debt appears appropriate.
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Attorney Fees and Costs
30.

Plaintiff sought an award of attorney fees against Defendant This case has

been long and bitter. The Court is unable to determine with precision where the fault lies
for this situation. The Court finds that both parties have been awarded considerable assets,
both are able to work and beat their financial needs, and both have incurred extensive
attorney fees. The Court sees no basis for requiring the Defendant to pay the Plaintiffs
attorney. It is appropriate that each be ordered to pay his or her own attorney fees.
31.

Costs should be awarded to Plaintiff as the prevailing party, upon the filing

of an appropriate memorandum of costs and disbursements.
Permanent Injunction
32.

Because of the negative and hostile interactions between the parties during

the course of these proceedings, it is appropriate that the Court enter a mutual, permanent
injunction, permanently restraining and enjoining the parties from bothering, molesting,
harassing, threatening, or libeling the other, and interfering with the other in any way.
Further, said permanent injunction should enjoin and restrain the parties from saying
anything derogatory about the other in the presence of hearing of the parties' minor
children, and each should be permanently enjoined and restrained from permitting any
friend or relative from saying or doing anything derogatory about or towards the other in
the presence of the minor children.
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Execution of Documents
33.

The parties should be required to execute and deliver documents reasonably

necessary to carry out the division of debts, liabilities, assets and properties set forth above.
Marital and Business Records
34.

Both parties are in possession of marital and business records. If requested,

the party in possession of such records should provide a copy of any requested records to
the other at the requesting party's expense.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action and the persons

of the parties.
2.

Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant upon the

ground of irreconcilable differences, to become final and effective immediately upon
execution, filing, and entry in the register of action.
3.

Child custody, visitation, and support should be ordered as set forth above.

4.

Medical, dental, and optical insurance coverage for the minor children should

be obtained as set forth above and costs of such coverage shared equally by the parties.
Medical, dental, and optical expenses reasonably incurred for the benefit of the children but
not covered by insurance, should be apportioned and shared equally between the parties.
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5.

No alimony should be awarded either party, except Defendant should be

required to assume and pay debts assigned to him in lieu of alimony.
6.

Debts, liabilities assets and properties of the parties should be divided,

awarded, and assigned as set forth above.
7.

The parties should be ordered to pay their respective attorney fees.

8.

Plaintiff, as prevailing party, should be awarded her costs upon filing an

appropriate memorandum of costs and disbursements.
9.

A permanent injunction should issue as set forth above.

10.

The parties should be required to execute and deliver documents reasonably

necessary to carry out and implement the division of debts and assets indicated above.
LET A DECREE OF DIVORCE BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.

DATED this _ ^ ? J L day of / 6 ^ ^ ^ ^ t ^ . 1995.
BY THE COURT:

^PHILIP EV^£ District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff
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J. BRUCE READING
Attorney for Defendant
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Addendum n C n :

Decree of Divorce Dated December 21, 1995

DEC 211995

WILLARD R. BISHOP, P.C.
Willard R. Bishop - #0344
Attorney for Plaintiff
P. O. Box 279
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279
Telephone: (801) 586-9483
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BEAVER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE,
Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)

CRAIG VERNON DAVIE,

)
)
)

Defendant

DECREE OF DIVORCE

Civil No. 94-CV-29
Honorable J. Philip Eves

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial to the Court on January 10 and
II, 1995, in connection with all issues extant in the case, as set forth in the Pretrial Order.
Plaintiff JETTA ANN PEARSON DAVIE appeared personally and was represented by her
attorney of record, Mr. Willard R. Bishop. Defendant CRAIG VERNON DAVIE also
appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of record, Mr. J. Bruce Reading.
Following the completion of presentation of evidence on the second day of trial, the parties
and the Court determined it would be appropriate to submit arguments in writing. The
schedule for submission of the arguments was set and the Court took the matter under
submission pending the filing of the arguments. Thereafter, on May 23,1995, Plaintiff filed

a document entitled "Notice of Readiness for Decision". The Court having previously
reviewed the written submissions of t^e pai ties, and having previously made and entered its
Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law;
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED as follows:
Decree of Divorce
1.

Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded a decree of divorce from

Defendant upon the ground of irreconcilable differences, said decree to become final and
effective immediately upon execution, filing and entry in the register of actions.
Custody and Visitation
2.

That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded the care, custody and

control of the parties' minor children, and Defendant is hereby awarded reasonable rights
of visitation as provided in UCA 30-3-35 (1953, as amended), and such other liberal and
reasonable visitation as may be worked out between the parties in advance, said visitation
to be conditioned upon Defendant's compliance with the following conditions:
A.

Visitation is to be arranged so that it does not unnecessarily or

unreasonably interfere with the school work and work activities of the boys.
B.

Defendant's right to overnight visitation shall be conditioned upon

providing suitable living quarters for the boys during the visit. It is not appropriate

?

for the boys to visit in the home of Defendant when Grace McFall and her two
children are spending the night there.
Child Support
3.

That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded, and Defendant should be

and he hereby is required to pay to Plaintiff, child support in the amount of $192.30 per
month per child, or $384.60 per month. Such child support shall be paid until such time as
the children reach their age of majority or complete high school, whichever occurs later,
from and after January 11, 1995.

Withholding shall be required in accordance with

applicable law. In the event that the children visit with Defendant for more than 25 of 30
consecutive days in the summertime for extended visitation, then the base support award
for each child will be reduced by 50% for that period of time.
Medical and Dental Insurance
4.

That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is required to obtain and maintain

medical, dental, and optical insurance coverage for the benefit of the parties' minor children
when available at reasonable cost Premiums applicable to the children's coverage shall be
shared equally by the parties, as shall medical, dental, and optical expenses for the children
which are not covered by insurance.
Tax Deductions
5.

That each party shall be permitted to claim one of the children as a dependent

for state and federal income tax purposes.
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No Alimony
6.

No alimony is awarded either party, provided, that Defendant shall assume

and pay debts which the Court will assign to him hereafter, in lieu of alimony, since Plaintiff
will not be able to support herself if required to pay the debts assigned to Defendant.
Division of Assets
Plaintiffs Separate Property
7.

That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded, as her sole and separate

property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the items listed below which were and
are her premarital property. No value is assigned to the items of premarital property
awarded to Plaintiff for the reason that their value is irrelevant, those items not being
division between the parties.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
0.
P.
Q.

250 cc Honda motorcycle
175 cc Kawasaki/Yamaha motorcycle
Rototiller
Antique sewing machine
Newer sewing machine
Hope chest from the master bedroom
Bunk bed
Single bed
Full bed
Double bed
Bosch bread machine
Wheat grinder
Piano
Electric key board
Small color television with doors
Stereo
White tin shed
4

R.
S.
T.
U.
V.
W.
X.

Couch and Soveseat
Rocking chair
One meat saw
1974 Ford truck
Plaintiffs personal items stored in the railroad building
Plaintiffs personal items and premarital property stored in the rafter
of the garage
Plaintiffs wedding ring set
Defendant's Separate Property

8.

That Defendant should be and he hereby awarded, as his sole and separate

property, free and clear of any claim of Plaintiff, the items set forth below, which were and
are his premarital property. No value is assigned to these items for the reason that their
value is irrelevant, they not being subject to a division between the parties.

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
I.
J.
K.
L.
M.
N.
0.
P.
Q.

R.

All interest in Cow Hollow property
Fuel tank and stand
Portable welder.
Banker's Life Annuity
Paul Revere Annuity
Woodburning stove
Tool chest
Acetylene tanks and carrier
One meat saw
Flatbed trailer
1972 Ford truck, which Defendant should be ordered to remove from
Plaintiffs property.
350 cc Honda motorcycle
1961 stock truck
Antique watch and case
Motor manuals
Fire extinguisher in garage
Leica 35mm camera
Collection of purple bottles
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S.
T.

U.

His scrap books and pictures, provided, however, that Plaintiff shall be
permitted to obtain copies for herself, should she so desire.
Defendant's premarital property stored in the rafters of the garage,
together with such personal items as may belong to him in that
storage.
The red chain saw
Plaintiffs Marital Property

9.

That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is awarded, as her sole and separate

property, free and clear of any claim of Defendant, the following items of marital property:
A.

One-half interest in the Western Rock lease of water from a windmill
at the 13-Mile/Kirk Farm, and a site upon which Western Rock keeps
its batch plant. Lease payments from this lease are to be paid directly
to Dr. Prince for the orthodontic care of the parties' minor children.
After Dr. Prince is paid off, the remaining balance of the Western
Rock payments are to be equally divided between the parties. The
Court affixes no value to this award since it is impossible to determine
what the actual value of the lease will be after Dr. Prince has been
paid, and for the further reason that there is no need to set a value
upon the interest here awarded, since it will be divided equally
between the parties.

B.

The $150.00 already received by Plaintiff from the sale of hay to
Mildred Loveridge. Defendant has also received $150.00 from that
source.

C.

The family home located in Minersville, Beaver County, State of Utah,
more specifically described as follows:.
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Lot 2, Block 31, Plat "B",
Minersville Town Survey, and running thence North 9 rods; thence
North 51'30' East 3.2 rods; thence South 1.2 rods; thence North
60-53* East 4.82 rods; thence South 11.53 rods; thence West 7 rods to
the point of beginning.
Together with all rights, privileges,
improvements, and appurtenances thereunto belonging or any wise
appertaining.
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The Court finds that the home belonged to Plaintiff prior to her
marriage to Defendant. The Court further finds that Defendant made
significant contributions to the home in terms of a lump sum
contribution as well as payments towards loan obligations. The Court
heard evidence from Plaintiff that the current value of her home is
$51,000.00. The Court also heard evidence from an appraiser that the
current value is $78,000.00. The appraiser did admit that he was
unable to find comparable sales in the Minersville area and used
comparable sales from Beaver to establish his value. He also admitted
that there were certain repairs and extensive termite damage that he
had not considered in arriving at his value. The Court is of the
opinion that the fair market value is closer to the $51,000.00 testified
to by the Plaintiff rather than the $78,000.00 testified to by the
appraiser. Accordingly, the Court fixes the current value of the home
at $51,000.00. The parties testified that there are currently liens
totaling $19,850.00 against the home, consisting of $14,700.00 owed to
Rosemary Bowman and $5,150.00 owed to Plaintiffs parents. Thus,
the current equity in the home is $31,150.00. Plaintiff argued that
some amount of the equity should be awarded to her as premarital in
view of the fact that she owned the home for several years prior to her
marriage to Defendant The Court is unable, however, to determine
from the testimony presented what portion of the equity accrued prior
to the marriage and portion accrued since March of 1978, when the
parties were married. The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant
have made various contributions to the home from both marital and
separate funds. The Court cannot determine by a preponderance of
the evidence the exact nature or amount of the contributions.
Therefore, the Court finds that because of commingling, the equity in
the home is to be treated as marital property in total. Therefore, the
Court finds the home should be awarded to Plaintiff, but fixes the
value of that award at the total of the equity in the amount of
$31,150.00.
D.

The newspaper building located in Milford, Beaver County, Utah, with
a value of $6,000.00, which property is more specifically described as
follows:
Beginning at a point of West boundary line of Lot 4, said point being
175.35 feet from Northwest corner of Block 10, Plat "B", Milford Town
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Surrey, thence South 80 07' East 69.41 feet: thence South 24 55' West
32.77 feet; thence North 80 07' West 61.04 feet; thence North 9 53'
East 31.65 feet to beginning. Together with all rights, privileges, and
appurtenances thereunto belonging.
The Mineral Range grazing rights/AUMS, with a value of $8,000.00,
specifically described as being and including:
(1)

Share Certificate No. 209, including 23 one and one-half shares
of common stock of the North Divide Grazing Company.

(2)

Mineral Range AUMS, described as follows:
Including, but not limited to, 36 AUMS, as evidenced by
Minersville No. 6104 and 121 AUMS as evidenced by Mineral
Range No. 6107, and including 112 AUMS suspended non-use.

A one-fourth (VA) undivided interest in and to all NADA lands, BLM
grazing rights, the State land lease, NADA Corporation stock,
associated water rights and improvements. The land included in
NADA is located in Iron County, State of Utah, and is more
specifically described as follows:
(1)

Parcel 1: The South quarter of Section 3, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(2)

Parcel 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, and the South one-half of
Section 4, all in Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(3)

Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10. 11, and 12, all in Section
5, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.

(4)

Parcel 4: Lots 1, 2, and 4, all in Section 6, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

8

(5)

Parcel 5: The West one-half; and the South one-half of the
Southeast quarter, both in Section 8, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(6)

Parcel 6: The Southeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the
Southwest quarter; and the South half of the Southwest quarter,
all in Section 9, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(7)

Parcel 7: The Northeast one-quarter; the East one-half of the
Northwest one-quarter; and the North one-half of the Southeast
one-quarter, all in Section 30, Township 31 South, Range 12
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(8)

Parcel 8: The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the
North one-half of the Southwest one-quarter; the Southwest
one-quarter of the Southwest one-quarter; all in Section 1,
Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.

(9)

Parcel 9: The North one-half of Section 12, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(10)

Parcel 10: The West one-half of Section 15, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(11)

Parcel 11: The West one-half of Section 22, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(12)

Parcel 12: The West one-half of Section 23, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(13)

Parcel 13: The West one-half of Section 26, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(14)

Parcel 14: The Northeast one-quarter of Section 33, Township
31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
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(15)

Parcel 15: The Southeast one-quarter of Section 28, Township
31 South, range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(16)

Parcel 16: The West one-half of Section 2, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(17)

Parcel 17: The West one-half of Section 3, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(18)

Parcel 18: The Southwest one-quarter of Section 11, Township
32 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(19)

Parcel 19: The Northeast one-quarter and the North 23 acres
of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 10, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including, but not limited to,
374 AUMS formerly belonging to Rosemary G. D. Bowman,
who took title as Rosemary G. Davie, in the NADA BLM
allotment.
TOGETHER WITH WUC No. 71-1450, 71-1451, 71-1698, 711713, 71-1723, and 71-1724, and any and all other water rights
pertaining thereunto.
TOGETHER WITH all interest in State of Utah Grazing Lease
No. 20730, and any subsequent State of Utah Grazing Leases.
TOGETHER WITH all oil and mineral and geothermal rights,
together with the right of ingress and egress for mining,
exploring, and/or removing the same.

(20)

The State of Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry
Grazing Permit No. GP-20730, containing 102 AUMS, more or
less, covering 2,898.24 acres, more or less, of land owned by the
State of Utah, consisting of Sections 16 and 32 in Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
including all of Sections 32 and 36, and the West half of
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Section 21, in Township 31 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

G.

(21)

All windmills, water right improvements,
improvements.

and other

(22)

All ownership interest in NADA, whether manifested by share
certificates or otherwise.

The Kirk/13-Mile Farm, with a value established at $40,000.00, located
in Beaver County, Utah, and more specifically described as follows:
(1)

Parcel 1: Lot 2 and the Southwest quarter of the Northeast
quarter of Section 5, Township 30 South, Range 11 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.

(2)

Parcel 2: Lots 1, 2, and 3; the South half of the Northeast
quarter and the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter of
Section 4, Township 30 South, Range 11 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian.

(3)

Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, and 4 and the South half of the North
half of Section 3, Township 30 South, Range 11, West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including but not limited to,
36 AUMS as evidenced by Minersville No. 6104 and 121
AUMS as evidence by Mineral Range No. 6107, and 112
AUMS suspended non-use.
SUBJECT TO a life estate in Rosemary Davie Bowman in and
to all geothermal rights, together with the right of ingress and
egress for the purpose of exploring and/or removing the same.
TOGETHER WITH all rights, privileges, improvements, and
appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining
thereunto.
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(4)

Parcel 4: Beginning at the South quarter corner of Section 33.
Township 29 South, Range 11 West, Salt Lake Base &
Meridian; thence Westerly along the section line to a point 160
feet West of the South quarter corner of said Section 33;
thence North 160 feet; thence East 160 feet to the center
section line of said Section 33; thence South 160 feet along the
section center line to the point of beginning.

H.

An undivided one-half interest in and to the water rights owned by the
parties, as evidenced by WUC 71-1650 and 20105, containing 116.02
acre feet of water, including 25.4 acre feet of water for irrigation, stock
watering equivalent for 500 units (14 acre feet), and one domestic
right, approximately .045 acre feet. In the event that the domestic
water right cannot be divided, it shall be awarded to Plaintiff to be
used with the Kirk Farm, and one-half of the value of that right shall
be paid by Plaintiff to the Defendant as compensation.

I.

As indicated above, the Minersville Range AUMS shall be awarded to
Plaintiff. The value of those grazing rights is fixed at $1,350.00.

J.

The gravel pit on the Kirk Farm. The value of the gravel pit is
included in the $40,000.00 value assigned to the Kirk/13-Mile Farm,
above.

K.

The 13-Mile Farm lease, with a value of $3,900.00.

L.

The horse named "Splash*1 with a value fixed in the amount of $700.00.
If the horse is not returned to Plaintiff by Defendant within 30 days
after the judgment to be entered hereafter is entered, Defendant shall
be required to pay Plaintiff the cash equivalent of the value of the
horse.

M.

The horse named "Blondie" with a value set in the amount of $700.00.
The horse shall be returned to Plaintiff by Defendant within 30 days
of the entry of judgment herein. If the horse is not returned to
Plaintiff within 30 days, Defendant shall to pay to Plaintiff the cash
equivalent of the value of the horse.
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N.

One-half of all cattle owned by the parties, not previously sold or
divided. Plaintiff is hereby required to prepare two (2) lists of what
she perceives to be an equal division of such cattle and calves.
Defendant shall then be allowed to choose which list he prefers, and
upon this basis the previously undivided cattle and calves should be
and hereby are, distributed.

O.

Because of the circumstances in this case, in the event that either
Plaintiff or Defendant is found to have take more than his or her fair
share of cows, or to have secreted cows from the other party, the
Court, following hearing, shall enter an order requiring the offending
party to pay to the other party double the value of the cows secreted.

P.

The Angus and Hereford bulls at the agreed value of $2,000.00.

Q.

The John Deere bailer at the value of $2,500.00.

R.

The John Deere 2280 swather at the value of $10,000.00.

S.

The six-cylinder ruined engine shall be awarded to Plaintiff, and the
four-cylinder engine shall be awarded to Defendant. No value is set
for these items,, their values being deemed equal bythe Court.

T.

The stationary welder at the value of $300.00.

U.

The John Deere chain saw with a value of $300.00.

V.

The air compressor and air tank with a total value for both pieces of
$250.00.

W.

The various remaining farm tools consisting of shovels, rakes, hoes,
pitch forks, etc., with a value set at $200.00.

X.

The 1979 Ford Courier pickup, with a value of $500.00.

Y.

The 1973 Mercuiy, with a value of $50.00.

Z.

The. four-horse trailer, with a value of $1,000.00.
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AA.

Her Utah State Retirement Fund Account, with a value of $1,400.00.

AB.

The used freezer in her home, with a value of $100.00.

AC.

The two, used refrigerators found on Plaintiffs property, with a value
of $100.00 for both pieces.

AD.

The four-drawer filing cabinet located in Plaintiffs home. No value
is affixed to this item in view of the fact that the metal filing cabinet
of equal value is going to be awarded to Defendant.

AE.

Two lawn mowers, with value set at $100.00 each, for a total value of
$200.00.

AF.

The prefabricated saddle stand, with a value of $50.00.

AG.

The washer and diyer, with a value of $600.00 for both pieces.

AH.

The microwave oven, with a value of $100.00.

AI.

The dishwasher, with the agreed value of $200.00.

AJ.

The organ which is located in the family home. Its value is set at
$600.00 in recognition of the fact that the organ was at least partially
paid for prior to the marriage of the parties.

AK.

The small color television set, value $50.00.

AL.

The home computer, printer and programs with a value of $500.00.

AM.

The video cassette recorder with a value of $50.00.

AN.

The various VCR tapes in Plaintiffs home, with a set value of $300.00,
provided, however, that Defendant should be allowed to copy any
noncommercial tapes that he chooses.

AO.

The camcorder, with a value of $100.00.

AP.

The stereo cabinet, with a value of $50.00.
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AQ.

The almond-colored tin shed which is on a slab located on the real
estate surrounding the home. The value of this item has been
included in the value of the home, already fixed by the Court.

AR.

The kitchen utensils and luxury appliances, including the fire
extinguisher in the kitchen, with a value of $50.00.

AS.

The couch in the'basement of the marital home, with a value of
$200.00.

AT.

One-half of all compact discs and cassettes owned by the parties at the
time of their separation. The other one-half of the compact discs and
cassettes shall be awarded to Defendant. The parties are to divide the
cassettes and compact discs equally between them. If they are not able
to do so, the Court shall conduct a hearing for making the division
upon notice to both sides.

AU.

The kitchen table and chairs, with value of $250.00.

AV.

The pictures, knick-knacks, clocks, collectibles and porcelain figures,
etc., with the value of $1,000.00.

AW. The posthole digger which was the purchased by the parties, with a
value of $200.00.
AX.

One-half of the poles owned by the parties at the time of trial, with
Defendant receiving the other one-half.

AY.

The grain barrel, not including the trailer, with a value of $200.00.

AZ.

One-half of the net wire owned by the parties at the time of trial, with
Defendant receiving the other one-half.

BA.

The acetylene torch now in her possession. No value is affixed by the
Court since the Marquette torch is awarded to the Defendant and the
Court deems the two torches of equal value.

BB.

The 35mm Canon camera, with value of $100.00.
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BC.

Her wedding ring set. The set was a gift to her during the marriage.
No value is set because it is her separate property.

BD.

The 1990 Dodge Dynasty, with value of $6,000.00.

BE.

Her own scrap books and pictures. Defendant shall likewise be
awarded his own scrap books and pictures. Each party shall be
authorized to obtain copies of any photographs retained by the other
party.

BF.

The two work tables shall be divided between the parties. Plaintiff
shall be awarded the table which Sheb and Seth Davie are currently
using for their reloading equipment. Defendant shall be awarded the
other table. No value is set for the reason that the Court deems the
tables to be of equal value.
Defendant's Marital Property

10.

That Defendant should be and hereby is awarded, as his sole and separate

property, free and clear of any claim of Plaintiff, the following items of marital property:
A.

The obligation owed to the parties by Ray Barnes, with the value of
$375.00.

B.

The balance owed by Warren Gray for a hay purchase in 1993, with a
value of $750.00.

C.

The balance owed to the parties for hay purchases by Mark Thompson
in 1993, with a value of $475.00.

D.

The amount of $150.00 already received by Defendant from Mildred
Loveridge for a hay purchase.

E.

The balance owing from Beaver County for gravel purchased from the
13-Mile/Kirk Farm, with a value of $400.00.

F.

The balance owing to the parties for hay purchased by Les Whitney in
1993, with a value of $344.00.
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The clinic building located in Milford, Beaver County, Utah, with a
value set at $6,000.00, which clinic building is more specifically
described as follows:
Commencing at a point on Westerly sideline of Lot 4 from which the
Northwest corner of said Block 10, Plat "B", Milford Town Survey,
bears North 9-53* East 207 feet South 80-07' East 61.04 feet to a
point on Westerly line of railroad right-of-way; thence South 24-55*
West 37.95 feet; thence North 80-07' West 51.2 feet to a point on
Easterly line of Main Street from which point the Southern extremity
of Lot 4 bears South 9*53' West 190.61 feet; thence North 9 53' East
along East line of Main Street 36.65 feet to beginning. Together with
all rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging.
An undivided one-quarter interest in all NADA property, water rights,
improvements, shares, or ownership, thus resulting in an equal division
of all NADA interests between the parties. Legal descriptions of the
properties are more specifically described as follows:
(1)

Parcel 1: The South quarter of Section 3, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(2)

Parcel 2: Lots 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12, and the South one-half of
Section 4, all in Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(3)

Parcel 3: Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12, all in Section
5, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.

(4)

Parcel 4: Lots 1,~2, and 4, all in Section 6, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(5)

Parcel 5: The West one-half; and the South one-half of the
Southeast quarter, both in Section 8, Township 31 South,
Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(6)

Parcel 6: The Southeast quarter; the Northeast quarter of the
Southwest quarter; and the South half of the Southwest quarter,
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all in Section 9, Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.
(7)

Parcel 7: The Northeast one-quarter; the East one-half of the
Northwest one-quarter: and the North one-half of the Southeast
one-quarter, all in Section 30, Township 31 South, Range 12
West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(8)

Parcel 8: The Northwest quarter of the Southeast quarter; the
North one-half of the Southwest one-quarter; the Southwest
one-quarter of the Southwest one-quarter; all in Section 1,
Township 31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian.

(9)

Parcel 9: The North one-half of Section 12, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(10)

Parcel 10: The West one-half of Section 15, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(11)

Parcel 11: The West one-half of Section 22, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(12)

Parcel 12: The West one-half of Section 23, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(13)

Parcel 13: The West one-half of Section 26, Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(14)

Parcel 14: The Northeast one-quarter of Section 33, Township
31 South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(15)

Parcel 15: The Southeast one-quarter of Section 28, Township
31 South, range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(16)

Parcel 16: The West one-half of Section 2, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
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(17)

Parcel 17: The West one-half of Section 3, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(18)

Parcel 18: The Southwest one-quarter of Section 11, Township
32 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

(19)

Parcel 19: The Northeast one-quarter and the North 23 acres
of the Southeast one-quarter of Section 10, Township 32 South,
Range 13 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
TOGETHER WITH all AUMS, including, but not limited to,
374 AUMS formerly belonging to Rosemary G. D. Bowman,
who took title as Rosemary G. Davie, in the NADA BLM
allotment.
TOGETHER WITH WUC No. 71-1450, 71-1451, 71-1698, 711713, 71-1723, and 71-1724, and any and all other water rights
pertaining thereunto.
TOGETHER WITH all interest in State of Utah Grazing Lease
No. 20730, and any subsequent State of Utah Grazing Leases.
TOGETHER WITH all oil and mineral and geothermal rights,
together with the right of ingress and egress for mining,
exploring, and/or removing the same.

(20)

The State of Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry
Grazing Permit No. GP-20730, containing 102 AUMS, more or
less, covering 2,898.24 acres, more or less, of land owned by the
State of Utah, consisting of Sections 16 and 32 in Township 31
South, Range 12 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and
including all of Sections 32 and 36, and the West half of
Section 21, in Township 31 South, Range 13 West, Salt Lake
Base and Meridian.

(21)

All windmills,
improvements.

water
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right

improvements,

and

other

(22)

All ownership interest in NADA, whether manifested by share
certificates or otherwise.

I.

One-half of the water rights owned by the parties, as set forth in
paragraph 10H, above, except that if the domestic water right is
incapable of division, that water right should be awarded to Plaintiff
for her use on the Kirk Farm and one-half of the value of that right
is to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant to compensate him for
that right.

J.

The Goodwin Farm Lease, which has 30 years to run, for a total
current value of $90,000.00. Plaintiff contributed significantly to the
rehabilitation and improvement of the farm ground and irrigation
system subject to the lease, to the point that the value of the leasehold
interest constitutes marital property.

K.

The horse "Rosebud" and her colt, with a value of $1,000.00 for both
animals.

L.

The horse "Misty" with a value of $900.00.

M.

One-half of the cows, as previously stated in paragraph 9N, above,
concerning the award to Plaintiff.

N.

The polled Hereford bull and two, horned Hereford bulls, at the
agreed upon value of $3,000.00.

O.

The hay wagon, with the value of $6,500.00.

P.

The 4020 John Deere tractor, with a value of $6,000.00.

Q.

The New Holland baler, with value of $8,500.00.

R.

The sprayer, valued at $500.00.

S.

The corrugator, with an agreed upon value of $300.00.

T.

The scraper, with value set at $325.00.
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U.

The 10,000 gallon fuel tank, with value of $1,500.00.

V.

The four-cylinder ruined engine. No value is fixed, for the reason that
it is the same value as the six-cylinder engine to be awarded to
Plaintiff.

W.

The portable welder, with value of $300.00.

X.

The miscellaneous power and hand tools, with value set at $3,000.00,
partially in recognition of the fact that Defendant owned some of the
tools prior to the marriage. The exact division is impossible to
determine given the state of the evidence.

Y.

The Trailway bike, valued at $1,000.00.

Z.

A used refrigerator, valued at $50.00.

AA.

One small woman's saddle, valued at $600.00.

AB.

The food dryer, valued at $50.00.

AC.

His jewelry, if any, in the possession of Plaintiff, which should be
returned to him by Plaintiff. No value is fixed for the jewelry as it
appears that it was a gift and is the Defendant's separate property.

AD.

One-half of all compact discs and cassettes in the possession of the
parties. If necessary, the Court will hold a hearing to effectuate an
equitable distribution of those items.

AE.

Eight handmade quilts, with a value of $100.00 per quilt, for a total
value of $800.00.

AF.

Four western hats with a v?lue of $100.00 per hat, for a total value of
$400.00.

AG.

The silver belt buckle, with a value of $100.00.

AH.

Six hunting knives with a value of $100.00 per knife for a total of
$600.00.
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AI.

The weight bench and various barbells and dumbbells, with a value of
$200.00.

AJ.

One-half of the poles possessed by the parties at the time of the trial
in this case.

AK.

The trailer which now carries the Plaintiffs grain barrel. The value of
the trailer is fixed at $200.00.

AL.

One-half of the net chicken wire possessed by the parties at the time
of trial.

AM.

The Marquette torch. No value is fixed since it is considered of equal
value to the torch awarded to Plaintiff.

AN.

The second posthole digger, valued at $200.00.

AO.

The 1991 Ford diesel pickup truck, with value of $12,500.00.

AP.

The various utensils and dishes on the Cow Hollow property, with no
value fixed, since no value was proven.

AQ.

The work table in Plaintiffs garage which is not currently being used
by Seth and Sheb for their reloading activities. No value is affixed by
the Court, since this table is deemed tu be of equal value to the one
awarded to Plaintiff.

AR.

The "MC" brand and earmark, upon final distribution of all the cattle.
Value of all Marital Property

11.

The total value of the marital property awarded to Plaintiff is $121,450.00.

The total value of the marital property awarded to Defendant is $147,069.00.
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Property Not Awarded
12.

That various items of property discussed in argument by the parties were not

marital property, and are not subject to award to either party. Those items are as follows:
A.

The horse called "Little Red". The evidence demonstrates that this
horse actually belongs to Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the
parties.

B.

A horse called "Copper". The evidence now demonstrates that Copper
is deceased.

C.

A horse acquired in 1993. The evidence clearly demonstrates that the
horse in fact belongs to Plaintiffs father and not to the parties.

D.

A horse acquired in 1994. The evidence is clear that this horse is the
Plaintiffs property by gift from her sons and a gentleman admirer.

E.

The parties are not entitled to claim cows owned by other persons,
including their children.

F.

A certain 1986 F-250 pickup truck which the evidence demonstrates is
owned by Glade Mickelson, a friend of Plaintiff.

G.

A 1985 Mercury vehicle which the Defendant originally claimed was
a marital asset, but which has not been proven to exist.

H.

A 125 cc Yamaha motorcycle which the evidence shows is owned in
fact by Sheb and Seth, the parties* minor children.

I.

A 50 cc Suzuki moped which the evidence indicates is owned by Codi
Davie Lofland.

J.

A Yamaha 4-wheel ATV which likewise belongs to Codi Davie
Lofland.

K.

A four-horse fifth-wheel trailer which does not belong to the parties
butwhich the evidence shows belongs to one Robbie Eyre.
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L.

A man's saddle located at Plaintiffs house which the evidence shows
belongs to Glade Mickelson.

M.

Family recreation equipment. The Defendant claims that there is
various family recreational equipment belonging to the parties. The
Plaintiff disputes the existence of that equipment. The Court is unable
to determine whether that equipment exists. If it in fact it exists it
should be awarded to the Plaintiff for the children's use. No value is
fixed.

N.

The Defendant claims that there is a riding mower which is part of the
marital estate. The Court has received no evidence to prove that such
a mower exists. It is disputed by the Plaintiff. The riding mower is
not awarded.

O.

The Defendant claimed the existence of several hope chests which he
said belonged to the parties. The Court is convinced that one of the
hope chests in question belongs to Christi Davie Weldert, a daughter.
The other hope chests were not proven to exist and therefore are not
awarded.

P,

The second set of bunk beds. The Defendant claimed the existence of
a second set of bunk beds. The Plaintiff disputes the existence of that
set of beds. The Court finds that the existence of the beds has not
been proven and therefore, they are not awarded.

Q.

Defendant claimed the existence of two additional food dryers. The
Plaintiff disputed the existence of such additional food dryers. The
Court finds that the existence of the two additional food dryers has not
been proven, and therefore, they are not awarded.

R.

A third guitar. Defendant claimed the existence of a third guitar.
Plaintiff disputed such alleged existence. The Court finds that the
existence of the third guitar has not been proven, and therefore, it is
not awarded.

S.

The Court finds that the two saxophones belong to Seth and Sheb, the
two minor children of the parties.
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T.

Likewise, the two guitars in the possession of the Plaintiff belong to
Seth and Sheb, the minor children of the parties.

U.

Additional, 13-inch television sets. The parties apparently now agree
that although there were additional 13-inch television sets in the
possession of the parties, they are no longer existing and therefore, are
not awarded other than as set forth above.

V.

The parties and the children each own various pieces of horse tack.
Each should be awarded his or her own tack. If the parties are unable
to determine who owns what tack, the Court should convene a hearing
for purpose of making those awards upon proper notice from either
party.

W.

A trailer located on the Goodwin Farm clearly belongs to Rosemary
Bowman, and not to either of the parties.

X.

A saddle stand made by the Defendant and given to Seth and Sheb
belongs to the two children of the parties.
Division of Debts

13.

The Court shall use Plaintiffs values and evidence pertaining to the marital

debts and obligations owed by the parties.
Debts Assigned to Plaintiff
14.

That Plaintiff should be and she hereby is, required to assume and pay, and

to hold Defendant free and harmless therefrom, the following debts and obligations of the
parties:
A.

The debt owed to Mountain America Credit Union to purchase the
1990 Dodge Dynasty vehicle, approximately $5,200.00.

B.

The debt owed to Rosemary Bowman for the addition to the house,
approximately $14,700.00.
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C.

The debt owed to Ralph Pearson in connection with the balance on
the home, approximately $5,150.00.

D.

The debt owed to First Interstate Bank for an operating loan,
approximately $6,279.93.

E.

The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 4—19, for the
13-Mile Farm and the Goodwin Farm, approximately $43,321.70.

F.

The total of the above debts assigned to Plaintiff comes to
approximately $74,651.63.
Debts Assigned to Defendant

15.

That Defendant should be and he hereby is required to assume and pay, and

to hold Plaintiff free and harmless from, the following debts and obligations of the parties:
A.

The debt owed to First Security Bank to purchase the 1991 Ford diesel
truck, approximately $14,000.00.

B.

The debt owed to SCS and the State of Utah for well and gated pipe
on the Goodwin Farm, approximately $10,957.00.

C.

The debt owed to SCS and the State of Utah for a sprinkler system on
the Goodwin Farm, approximately $13,489.00.

D.

The debt owed to Minersville Feed and Supply, approximately
$16,800.00.

E.

The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-21, for the
13-Mile Farm and Goodwin Farm, in the amount of approximately
$21,194.87, and approximately $2,851.00, respectively.

F.

The debt owed to Farmers Home Administration, No. 44-22, for the
13-Mile and Goodwin Farms, approximately $29,380.58.

G.

The total debt assigned to Defendant comes to approximately
$105,821.45.
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H.

The requirement that Defendant assume and pay the above debts shall
be deemed a requirement in lieu of alimony. See paragraph 6, page
4, above.
Comparison of Debt Assignment

16.

The above assessment of debt requires Defendant to pay more debt than is

required of Plaintiff. In view of the fact that Defendant received a higher value of the
marital property, the division of debt appears appropriate.
Attorney Fees and Costs
17.

That each party is hereby required to pay his or her own attorney fees.

18.

Costs of court shall be awarded to Plaintiff as the prevailing party, upon the

filing of an appropriate memorandum of costs and disbursements.
Permanent Injunction
19.

That a mutual, permanent injunction be and hereby is entered in this matter,

permanently restraining and enjoining the parties from bothering, molesting, harassing,
threatening, or libeling the other, and from interfering with the other in any way. Further,
that said permanent injunction hereby enjoins and restrains the parties from saying anything
derogatory about the other in the presence or hearing of the parties' minor children, and
each is hereby permanently enjoined and restrained from permitting any friend or relative
from saying or doing anything derogatory about or towards the other in the presence of the
minor children.
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Execution of Documents
20.

That the parties should be and they hereby are required to execute and deliver

documents reasonably necessary to carry out the division of debts, liabilities, assets and
property set forth above.
Marital and Business Records
21.

Both parties are in possession of marital and business records. If requested,

the party in possession of such records shall provide a copy of any requested records to the
other at the requesting party's expense^
DATED this

day of L4^c~i*-M^-~- . 1995.
BY THE COURT:

istrict Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

WILLARD R. BISHOP
Attorney for Plaintiff

J. BRUCE READING
Attorney for Defendant
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BEAVER, UTAH; TUESDAY, JANUARY 10, 1995
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THE COURT:

Good morning.

Today is the 10th day

of January, 1995. The time is four minutes after 10:00.
The matter before the Court is 94-CV-29, entitled Jetta Ann
Pearson Davie versus Craig Vernon Davie.

I see the

plaintiff.
Is the defendant present?
MR. READING:

The defendant is en route, Your

Honor.
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed?
MR. READING:

We are, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Bishop, an opening

statement?
MR. BISHOP:

Oh, no.

I'll just start by calling

a witness, and we will just move on.
THE COURT: Mr. Reading, do you wish to make an
opening statement at this point?
MR. READING:

No,

I'll reserve it.

THE COURT: All right.
MR. BISHOP:

Call Jetta Ann Pearson Davie,

please.
Would you take the witness and be sworn.
sworn and take the witness stand.

Or be

Take those with you.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

134

season.
Q.

Sure.

Item number 30, please?

Is that the

clinic bill that you already told us about?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Item 31?

A.

Newspaper building.

Q.

We've already talked about that, have we not?

A.

Yes, sir.
THE COURT:

property?

Are those part of the same

30 and 31?
THE WITNESS:

They're not —

Yes. They're on the same deed.

they're not the same property.

They're on

the same warranty deed, but they are two separate pieces of
property.
THE COURT:

Okay.

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

THE COURT:
Q.

—

Attached.

—

THE WITNESS:

They're not physically

attached or adjoined?
They are two separate buildings.

Okay.

BY MR. BISHOP:

And the assessor sends out

separate tax notices, does he not?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And we have talked about Cow Hollow.

We've

talked about the Goodwin farm also, which is item number
33.
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It looks like here there's another mistake.

You

put a value earlier on the Goodwin farm of $244,100, and
now we've got items 33 and 34 that shows 5,070 per year on
33 and $2,400 on 34.
A.

I think —

Q.

What are those figures?

A.

We simply divided it up in —

into what we

thought the value of that property would be if someone were
to take over that lease for a year.
Q.

I see.

A.

And we priced it at the same thing that

Smithfield had leased the 13-Mile farm to me for a year,
which was $30 per acre. And I'm assuming that's a fair
value for —
Q.

for the Goodwin farm too.

So you're saying the two figures that were there

on 33 and 34 now are rental figures for the property for
one year?
A.

For one year, yes, sir.

Q.

I see.

Item 35 we've talked about.

36 we've

talked about.
Let's go to 37, please.
Nada —

or 37-A.

We have talked about

Is that the ground itself?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you're suggesting that that be divided

equally between you and Mr. Davie?
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

37-B.

How does that compare with item 24?

THE COURT:

Can I go back to 37?

MR. BISHOP: Sure.
THE COURT:
have you got in mind?

When you say divided equally, what
The undivided interest?

THE WITNESS:

The undivided interest.

I

discussed it with my attorney, that I would like to pick
out a piece of ground and then —

but since Rosemary has an

undivided one half interest, that's not something that
could be done.
THE COURT:

You're not asking for a partition of

the property at this stage?
THE WITNESS:

I am not, sir.

Just —

just an

interest.
THE COURT:

All right.

THE WITNESS:

Like I say, it's a big area, and

none of it is fenced within the —

within the inside

perimeter.
THE COURT:
Q.

Okay.

BY MR. BISHOP:

Go ahead, Mr. Bishop.

Item 37-B, please?

Would you

compare that to item 24. Have we got a double entry here?
A.

We've just stated on 24 that we wanted it

divided in half.

And on 37, we simply put a value as to

what those-AUM's were worth.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN

169
haul the hay with the hay wagon.
truck and tractor, but I —
Q.

Okay.

I've hauled hay with

I don't use the hay wagon.

You were also pretty knowledgeable in the

delivery of calves.
Have you ever done a cesarean?
A.

Most people don't do their own cesareans.

is capable of doing the cesareans.

Craig

I personally have

assisted in handing the tools to them and being there with
it, but the actual cutting —

if we have had it done —

been done by Craig or a veterinarian.

has

Most people use a

veterinarian.
Q.

Okay.

Before we leave page two, you've

estimated your husband's income at $1,500 per month.
Upon what did you base that estimation?
A.

There's an asterisk —

one. And it's stated

down at the bottom, imputed and estimated.

Defendant is

easily capable of earning 1,500 p^r month and should be
working.
Q.

And I'm just interested in your basis for that.

A.

He's capable of working.

He's apparently had

enough education and is strong and healthy and able of
earning that type of money.
welding.

He finished a course in

My understanding is he has spent the summer

welding with the pumice mining company.

I was told that he

made excellent money while welding there.
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not written down as an income that he had.
Q.

Let's —

let's go to page 21 of your Exhibit

No. 1.
I believe that is the beginning of the 1991 tax
information; is that correct?
A.

Yesf sir.

Q.

How much money in 1991 does it show that

Mr. Davie earned?
A.

That shows what he earned, not what he's capable

of earning.

That's a part-time job.

Q.

I understand.

Okay.

But you were living with

him at that time, and that was what was being done?
A.

That's why I was working too.

To bring up the

balance of the income.
Q.

Sure.

But nonetheless, that was the amount that

was earned in 1991 while you were still married to him;
correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Okay.

Now let's go to —

it looks like it's

page 37, 1992.
You were still married; correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Still living together?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Still working as a team?
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Still partners?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

How much did he earn in that year?

A.

Again, part-time job, 86 —

84 or 86.

what does it say?

I think it says 8,400.

Q.

8,400?

A.

The asterisk states that he's capable of

earning, not that's what he earns.
Q.

But nonetheless, while you were partners with

him and working with him, that was the amount that was
earned in your presence, right?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And the 1993 —

it looks like it's —

this is

really faint, so you're going to have to help me.
starts around page 56. Can you show me which —

It

or how

much he was earning.
MR. BISHOP: 54.
MR. READING:

Is it 54?

Page 54.

THE WITNESS:

I'm sorry.

MR. READING:

54. Thank you.

I can't read what it

says,
1993.

Q.

You were still married with him in 1993, right?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Still partners with him?
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A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Still living under the same home —

or under the

same roof?
A.

I'm sorry.

Which —

Q.

Page 54, uh-huh.

on page 54?

And during that year, how much was earned by
your husband?
A.

8,400.

Q.

All right.

But yet today, can you help me

understand why you believe after three of the past four
years while you were living with him and partners with him,
you believe that he should be earning more money now than
he was earning then?
A.

He was, as you stated, not capable of working a

full-time job, because he had too much farm and cattle. I
took on the responsibility of half of his farm work, and I
acquired another job besides.

Two more jobs besides. If

I'm capable of taking half of the farm and acquiring two
more jobs, certainly he should be capable of completing his
half of the farm and holding down a job.
Q.
ever has —

In fact, you really believe that he's not — nor
worked to his capability; isn't that correct?

A.

That's correct.

Q.

Okay.

On page three of P-l, the very bottom of

that page, it has "Craig annuity, Banker's Life; Craig
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annuity, Paul Revere."
When were those annuities purchased?
A.

They were purchased before we were married.

Q.

Has there been any contribution, to your

knowledge, made to those annuities since you've been
married?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

When were those contributions made?

A.

Well, we would probably have to go back 14, 15,

16, and 17 years ago. But yes, those contributions were
made up until the last —

there were probably five years of

contributions put into those until we froze them.
The purpose of these —
Q.

Ma'am, first of all, let's just kind of stick to

what I'm asking, and we'll get through this a little
quicker.
You say there have been five years of
contributions to those annuities?
A.

No.

that many years.

I said we would probably have to go back
I can't tell you exactly how many years

we contributed to it, but approximately that many.
Q.

Approximately five years; is that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And do you have any recollection of what that

contribution was for each of those five years?
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THE WITNESS:

The fifth, being the government

Q.

BY MR. READING:

A.

—

Q.

Uh-huh.

A.

Perhaps we should only be appraising the water

—

The government.

we're talking about?

and not the windmill on this.

Like I said, this was the

best of my ability to try to come up with something that
was a close valuation.
cost of —

If —

of it being —

if I should take away the

I don't know —

ground, we could do that.

the hole in the

I —

Q.

All right.

A.

If you have a better valuation, I'm willing

to —

to hear it, sir.
Q.

All right.

Has this ground appreciated at all

since it was gifted to you?
A.

Has this ground —

Q.

Appreciated at all since it was gifted to you

back in 1981?
A.

I don't know.

It —

it went through a period of

time when the MX was coming in that the values went sky
high.
again.

And when MX didn't come in, the value went down
And at this point, I don't think —

I actually feel

that it's probably about the same.
Q«

Okay.

On the top of page seven is the Goodwin

place, which is presently being leased to Mr. Davie, I
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believe; is that correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

You're not on the lease?

A.

No.

Q.

In fact, if Mr. Davie dies, you still wouldn't

be on the lease; is that correct?

You wouldn't have any

interest?
A.
lease.

It says on there —

I'd have to look at the

But it would go to his family.

Q.

The children would?

A.

I —

I —

His children,

I'm not sure, without reading it

again, if it would cover myself and my kids.
MR. BISHOP:
THE WITNESS:

Maybe we better read the lease.
I'd have to read the lease to be

sure of that.
MR. READING:
sure.

And let's turn to —
MR. BISHOP:

Q«

Why don't we do that to make

Yes, sir.

BY MR. READING:

attention —

I think it's 130.

And I'm going to call your

first of all, let's just kind of work through

it in stages.

Paragraph 14.

I want you to read paragraph

14 and tell us whether or not —

well, if you would agree

with me that this lease cannot be assigned or sublet.
MR. BISHOP:

Objection.

Calls for a conclusion

this witness is not qualified to give.
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THE COURT: Overruled,
THE WITNESS: Are you asking me to read it out
loud at this point or —
Q.
read it.

BY MR. READING:

No.

I think we all can just

I don't want to test your reading verbal skills.

If you will just read that and tell me after you've read it
if you believe this lease could be sublet or assigned.
A.

Well, as looking to the whole thing, it says

sublet the premises or any part thereof or allow any other
persons other than the lessee's agents, family and
servants.
Q.

Sure.

A.

I think a wife and kids happen to be part of a

family.
Q.

Agreed.

A.

The last I —

Q.

Agreed.

I heard.

But to sublet it to someone else to

generate income from it —
A.

That cannot be done.

Q.

—

is that possible?

All right.

Go now to page 133, which is page

four of the lease, and look, if you wouldn't mind, at
paragraph 17. And I guess —

read the whole thing for me,

but I'm most interested in the second paragraph of
paragraph 17.
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THE COURT:
Q.

Second paragraph?

BY MR. READING:

Okay.

Upon Craig's death, do you see

anywhere in that, that you would inure to the benefit of
this lease?

You, personally?

A.

No.

It states that it would be Seth and Sheb's.

Q.

All right. Now, let's go back to page seven and

help me understand how you evaluated the value of this
leasehold interest to you and to Mr. Davie at $244,100.
A.

It was done the same as we had done the 13-Mile

farm or to find a monthly on it.

It was —

THE COURT: A monthly what?
THE WITNESS:

I'm sorry.

A yearly on it. The

same as we had done with the 13-Mile farm.

It was $30 per

acre per year.
THE COURT:

I don't understand.

Yearly what?

Yearly income?
THE WITNESS: As a lease. As what someone would
have to pay to —

to have this property.

THE COURT: All right.
THE WITNESS:

Or what value it would be to

someone else.
THE COURT: A lease?
THE WITNESS:

So that someone would pay — yes.

What someone would pay to lease this property, is what it
was valued at.
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THE COURT: All right.
THE WITNESS: And the lease goes for 30 more
years.

So we're assuming that on a yearly basis, it would

be worth the $5,070 to lease it for the —

the crop ground,

and $2,400 a year to lease it for the pasture ground.

And

to find the actual value for the next 30 years as to what
the lease is, that's what the amount comes to.

That's how

we come to that amount.
Q.

BY MR. READING:

Did you present value that

stream of payments over the next 30 years to present value?
A.

Pardon me?

Q.

Well, for example, if we have a payment that we

expect to receive, and it's going to be coming in for 30
years —
MR. BISHOP:
MR. READING:

Stipulated she did not.
Okay.

If that's the case, then we

can go on.
THE COURT: All right.
Q.
$244,100 —

BY MR. READING:

The value that you have here of

who can have the benefit of that value as you

have read the lease?

In other words, are you entitled to

that benefit after you have read the lease?
A.

As long as I am his family or his wife, yes.

Q.

And as soon as that —

A.

At the point as —
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Q.

When that terminates —

A.

When that terminates, no.

Q.

Thank you.

That's all I have on that issue.

Now, you mentioned that you put in some
improvements on the Goodwin farm; is that correct?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

By mentioning that, are you demanding any kind

of recompense for the service that you rendered on the
Goodwin farm?

Did you want any kind of payment or any kind

of remuneration for that work?
A.

What I am stating is that because of the amount

of money and work that was put into that, it became a
marital asset.
Q.

I see. Well, let's take a look at the amount of

time that you took to do the various things that you
discussed concerning the improvements that you helped
with.
Now, I believe that you said that you cleaned
off —

what do they call that?

Q.

Land —

MR. BISHOP:

Land-planing.

MR. READING:

Thank you.

Did you do that each year?

land —

Is that it?

Land-planing?
A.

I didn't say I done it each year.

I said as the

crops were taken out and new crops were put in, yes, I did
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MR. BISHOP:

Let's ask.

May I approach the witness and give her some
notes?
THE COURT:

You may.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. READING:
Q.

Mrs. Davie, I asked you to take a look at what

the expenses were to produce that hay out on the 13-Mile
farm, and I think you've told me that you were able to put
those numbers together as to —

as to those expenses.

Could you share those with the —
A.

with the Court.

Repairs and parts were $8,524.37.

Fuel and oil

was $11,115.20. The operating loan that had to be paid was
$2,875.92.

The loan for the swather —

$2,215.38.

I made a payment of $1,938.34 on operating

loans to Farm Home Administration.

for the use — was

The income on the hay

was $29,300, and the outgo was $25,669.21, leaving a
balance profit of $3,630.79.
And that leaves the payment on the 13-Mile farm,
which will be made at the time the lease is acquired
through hopefully the decision of the Court, which is
$3,900, leaving a deficit of $269.21.

Still not paid is

the operating note from Minersville Feed for $3,000. And
with Farm Home Administration, I have a balance left
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paying —

owing to them of $2,400, leaving me a deficit of

$5,669.21.
Q.

Okay.

So when you testified on redirect that

the farm basically pays for the expenses to run the farm,
and you've got to go make a living to eat food, you weren't
kidding?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And has that been basically your experience with

both the Goodwin and the 13-Mile farm during the time that
you've been farming?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

So really, the value in farming, as I see it —

and —

and if you'll bear with me, because I'm trying to

get to the valuation question —

the value in farming, as I

see it, is the work ethic and the satisfaction you get out
of farming, number one, and number two, the increased value
in land, if you own the land, because that's your
investment?

You're hoping that, at least, is going to earn

a nest egg for you over the years; is that correct?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

What other value is there?

A.

When you purchase the farm, or when you go into

farming, you go in with the idea that it has to be able to
pay for itself to be able to make a profit off from it.
We've been working towards that.
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And if you remember in the testimony —
you do —

I'm sure

we discussed a flood that we had that done a lot

of destruction, that money had to be borrowed.

In

preparation and through financing, if Craig and I were able
to pay our debts in full for '94 and '95, the debts we had
incurred because of these problems would then be cleared
enough away that we would each show a profit off from
that.

This discussion had been made.

We would be able to

probably live without extra jobs off from the farm if we
were able to pay those debts by '96.
Q.

Have you not —

A.

And that's what we're striving for.

Q.

Good.

In the time of your marriage, when you've

had a farming operation, have you ever been able to live
off the farming operation without extra jobs?
A.

We haven't.
MR. READING:

Okay.

No further quest ions.

THE COURT: Any other questions , Mr. Bishop?
MR. BISHOP: One.

RE-REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BISHOP:
Q.

If the flood had not occurred, do you believe

youi'd now be in a profit situation?
A.

Of course, sir.
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MR. BISHOP:

Nothing further of this witness at

THE COURT:

Do you want to explain to me how the

this time.

4

flood plays into the figures you just gave us.

5

understand it.

6

THE WITNESS:

I didn't

When we received the lease on the

7

Goodwin farm, we had put one piece of property —

8

one piece of property.

9

THE COURT:

reseeded

Put grain in it.
On the Goodwin farm?

10

THE WITNESS:

On the Goodwin farm.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

THE WITNESS:

I don't know if you remember when

13

the reservoir flooded over and went down and filled the

14

Sevier Lake.

15

several weeks, completely destroyed that farm.

That water ran over the top of our farm for

16

Because of that, we not only lost the money that

17

we had put into the crop and lost not having any profit and

18

the money we put into fuel, electricity to farm that crop

19

that we'd already started farming, but we also lost all the

20

ditches and a well. And we had to borrow another $48,000,

21

which was 3 percent interest, which was good money, but we

22

still had to borrow that money,

23

a crop, the whole thing had to be put back together.

24

then had a payment of 4,900 and some odd dollars to make

25

every year on that.

so not only did we not get
We

And we were another like four years
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THE WITNESS:
costs.

That would be after demolition

So it could be worth more than that —

Six —

it —

well, no.

6,000 each. And that would be if you were to

buy itf then you would have to pay for the demolition on
top of that.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

So —

So this is the value of the land

without considering demolition costs?

Is that what you're

saying?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
Q.

Yes, yes.

Okay.

BY MR. READING:

Next question?

Did I ask you to take a look at

the 640 acres in the name of the parties that is commonly
referred to by me as the 13-Mile farm and I think by the
defendants as the —
Farm?

or by the plaintiffs as the Kirk

Did you take a look at that acreage?

A.

Yes, I have.

Q.

And what did you do to —

and did I ask you to

give me an appraisal of what just the cost of the acreage
or the value of the acreage would be?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What did you do in preparation of giving me your

opinion today?
A.

The sr.me process as before.

L
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Q.

Why don't you explain that so we have that on

the record,
A*

Well, you'd research the market.

sales that have taken place in that area.
potential for —

for growth.

If —

The —

The —

the

the

if, you know, the pig

farm is going in in that particular area, then values are
going to be affected one way or the other.
Q.

It's my understanding that this is essentially

sagebrush land?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

Did you equate into your value per acre anything

to do with water rights?
A.

No.

Q.

What is the value that you established per acre

for that?
A.
that —

I have —

yeah.

I have $80 an acre. And

that is a reflection upon it being in a closer

location to this pig farm.
Q.

Okay.
THE COURT: And that's again raw ground?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Yes, it is. Brush land.

I mean that's your —

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT:
ground?

Your value there is just for the

Not for improvements; not for water rights?
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1

THE WITNESS: Right.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MR. READING:

4

THE COURT:

Cross-examination?

5

MR. BISHOP:

Yes, Your Honor.

6

That's all the questions I have.

I'd like the

bailiff to give D-5 to the witness.

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. BISHOP:

9

D-5?
D-5.

It's the diagram.

There it

is right there in front of the witness.

10

The sticker in front to your left,

11

Mr. McKibben.

12
13

CROSS-EXAMINATION

14

BY MR. BISHOP:

15

Q.

16

Do you have what's been marked for

identification and admitted as D-5?

17

A.

Yes, I do.

18

Q.

And do you recognize that document?

19

A.

Well, it —

20

that's —

21

it's like the Kirk Farm area

as has been referenced.

Q.

This is the area —

22

I

A.

Yes.

23

I

Q.

—

24

I as —

25

I

that you've just been talking about as far

designated as the pig farm area; correct?

A.

Okay.
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for her cows, you did the same thing; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

Q.

But the actual sales were 16,488.60?

Isn't that

what that document states?
A.

17,000.

Is that —

Q.

Look at item 21 on the account.

A.

All right. No.

You want to use your 17,529.

Because I did bale a little extra hay, and I did sell that.
Q.

All right. Does the expenses —

shown on this operation show to be 26,000 —

the expenses
or —

A.

24.

Q.

On D-19, your expenses were $24,095; is that

correct?
A.

Right.

Q.

What —

does that show that you operated at a

profit or a loss?
A.

At a loss.

Q.

All right.

Has that generally been your

experience with the Goodwin farm?
A.

Yes.
MR. READING:

We'd move for D-16's admission

merely to show his expenses for 1994.
MR. BISHOP:
without it —

No objection to its admission,

admitting the numbers on it.

THE COURT: Actually it's not to show expenses,
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it's to show income.
MR. READING:

Income. And also —

that's true.

There is also expenses listed on the front sheet as well,
Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you have a copy for me?

If you

don't, I'll just look at the original.
MR. READING:

I wish you would.

the foul-ups I've had here.

That's one of

Your Honor, I didn't get that

copied, and I apologize, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.
your

What constitutes D-16 in

—
MR. READING:

It's two sheets, Your Honor.

There's a cover sheet and —

and an attachment sheet, which

is the break-out in total showing —

such as we did with

Mrs. Davie's account for 1994 and both of their accounts
for 1993.

I tried to have a break-out shown for his 1994

income, and that's what that is.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. READING:

Let's go ahead, then.

All right.

Q.

Do you have D-17 in front of you, sir?

A.

D-17.

Q.

Exhibit D-17.

A.

No.

All the exhibits here are gone.

MR. READING:

All right.

Could we have the

witness handed D-17.
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MR. BISHOP: Which one is that?
MR. READING:

D-17 is the profit and loss report

for Craig and Jetta Davie in 1993.
MR. BISHOP:

That's the one that Morris —

MR. READING:

That's the one we introduced

through Morris, uh-huh.
MR. BISHOP: Okay.
Q.

BY MR. READING:

I call your attention to the

front sheet of that document wherein farm expenses are
shown for the calendar year of 1993 to be $79,463.23.
Do you see that?
THE COURT: What
MR. READING:

~

It's about the second line from

the bottom on the first —
THE COURT:

I see it. Okay.

MR. READING:

The first

THE WITNESS: Okay.

~

Yeah.

Q.

BY MR. READING:

Do you see that?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Now, this is while you and Ms. Davie were living

together; isn't that correct?

1993?

A.

Right.

Q.

And do you have reason to challenge these

numbers as farm expenses for your —

for the period of

1993?
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Upon what basis do you challenge that number?

A.

In December, I picked up the November checks,

and I briefly went through them and went down them.

I sat

down also with the bank bookf and I went through those.
And the problem is where she allocates the funds.

What she

puts on "farm," and what she puts on "Christmas."
Q.

Okay.

Let's go —

you've been handed

Exhibit D-10.
What is that?
A.

This is a list I made from the checks that I

went through on my checkbook.
Q.

That's the time when you picked up the checkbook

A.

Not the checkbook, but the returned checks.

Q.

And you observed these checks having been

in —

written, is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And based upon that, what did you determine?

A.

That I come up with $5,454.45 in the month of

November were spent for Christmas.

And I went through the

roof.
Q.

Well, why would that then challenge your —

challenge the number entered for —

in the farm expenses on

D-17?
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A.

All right.

Because they're not where they

belong, in my opinion.
Q.

And what do you mean by that?

A.

She's charging mainly clothing and things she's

bought as gifts as farm expenses.
Q.

And what would give you that indication?

A.

D-10.

Q.

All right. And what on D-10 would give you that

indication?
A.

Do you want me to read the things that came up?

Heres a few of them.

Kmart, Wal-Mart, Burns, Maurice's,

Gart Brothers, Scandals, Jolley's, Enjoy Wear, IFA, Lee's.
Q.

Were those checks, as you looked at them,

designated as farm expenses?
A.

There was no designation to them.

Q.

Then how do you know that they were, in fact,

included in farm expenses?
A.

From the report that Morris —

Q.

All right.

Morris did.

So you reviewed those numbers and

found out that these checks were designated as farm
expenses; is that correct?
A.
CLM.

Yes. There's one more little check here.

Cedar Livestock Market.

It's a purchase of a horse

for $525.
Q.

It's

Was that designated as farm expenses or as
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personal, or do you know?
A.

It went to "Farm."

Q.

Okay.

A.

The horse ended up at Ralph Pearson's.

Q.

Oh.

Why is that check a concern to you?

All right.

THE COURT:

Why is that a concern to you?

THE WITNESS:

The first thing, I didn't know she

used our funds to buy a horse.

And the second thing is

that she told me it was a gift for Ralph.

And as far as

I'm concerned, we didn't have that kind of money to be
giving those kind of gifts.
THE COURT:
Q,

Okay.

BY MR. READING:

Mr. Davie, the farm operation

of the Goodwin place and of the 13-Mile farm —

to your

knowledge, have they ever made money for you?
A.

No.

Q.

All right.

I want to show you what's been

marked as D-6.
Can you identify this?
A,

Yes.

Q.

What is it?

A.

It's the Nada allotment.
MR. READING:

We'd move for its admission just

so we can talk about it, Your Honor.
MR. BISHOP:

No objection.
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THE COURT:

It's D-6?

MR. READING:
THE COURT:

That's correct.

It's received.

BY MR. READING:

Q.

How many families run cattle on

Nada?
A.

Now?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Okay.

There's two main entities, Davies and

Carters.
Q.

All right.

How many wells do you —

windmills

and wells do you own on Nada?
A.
no, no.

We own three outright.
All right.

The Bench, the Lewis —

The Bench, the Cliffs, and the Little

Nada well.
Q.

Okay.

Could you —

do you have the original

A.

Yeah.

I've got the original.

Q.

Would you mind just marking where those are on

there, sir?

Nada.
A.

All right.

Q.

Approximately.

A.

(Witness complied).

Q.

Now, one of those —

that are owned outright?
A.

those are the three wells

That means the ground

—

We own the land, the water, the windmill. We
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something.
Q.

And I got in return the use of the roads.
Has this pit generated other income in the past

other than just a doller per haul?
A.

Yes.

Q.

What income has it historically generated and

when?
MR. BISHOP:

Objection.

Foundation.

If he

could put it in a relative time period, I have no
objection.

But if we're going back to 1950, I think that's

a little vague.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

He can answer the

question.
THE WITNESS:

It would be back in the late '50s,

early '60s when Wayne Wiseman started his concrete
business.

And that income back then generated probably

around 1,500 to $2,000 a month.
Q.

BY MR. READING:

Have you had any major sales

like that between the late 1950s and just the occasional
haul by the county of your gravel?
A.

Not that amount.

They hauled some gravel out

there to dress up some roads for some drill sites and a few
other things.
Q.

Generally speaking, it is available, but it

isn't a hot product?
A.

No.
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1

Q.

All right.

2

that gravel pit —

3

a pit as an —

4

gravel and —

5
6

If you were to evaluate the worth of

in other words, you wanted to sell it as

as a place where people could generate
what would you put for a price?

MR. BISHOP:

Objection, Your Honor.

price is irrelevant. What we're —

7

MR. READING: Cost.

8

MR. BISHOP:

9

THE COURT: Sustained.

11

Q.

BY MR. READING:

What would be the fair market

value that you would suggest that would be worth?

13

A.

That's real hard.

14
15

-- looking for is fair market

value.

10

12

Asking the

THE COURT: We're talking about what now?

Just

the gravel?

16

MR. READING:

17

THE COURT: What did you include in the gravel

18

pit?

19
20

Just the gravel pit.

Q.
in —

BY MR. READING:

for the gravel pit?

What would you include in a —
Where is the gravel located?

21

A.

More to the north, the east, and the west.

22

Q.

How many acres?

23

A.

How many acres there of gravel?

24

Q.

Uh-huh.

25

A.

Many acres.

There's five acres of a gravel pit
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there.

If you retained five acres, you'd have to move an

awful lot of gravel to remove it.
massive value.

And it would have a

But the problem is is that the demand is

not there for that much gravel.

And if I were going to

sell it, I'd probably start at $50,000.
Q.

For the pit?
THE COURT:

You think that's the fair market

value of the gravel in the ground?
THE WITNESS:

No.

you'd go somewhere between —

If you go by a yard basis,
gravel is now going between

three and $5 a yard.
THE COURT:

We're not talking about selling the

gravel to a customer.

The question is as the gravel sits

there on the ground —

and whatever you include in the

gravel pit.

And I think you're saying you'd include about

five acres of ground.
THE WITNESS: Uh-huh.
THE COURT:

What would be the —

the price that

you think that gravel would —
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

—

Sell for?
sell for on the market between a

willing buyer and a willing seller, if you just put it on
the market as it sits on the ground and said, "I want to
sell this gravel pit"?
THE WITNESS:

I wouldn't go less than $50,000.
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ground.
A.

All right.

Q.

Is irrigated farm ground in that general area

going for —

a lease that is for $30 an acre?

A.

I wouldn't know.

Q.

All right.

I haven't checked into it.

Is the same thing true with respect

to what you can get for pasturage?

You don't know what you

can get for pasturage?
A.

I charge $35 per head per month on the horses.

Q.

For just flat out pasturage?

A.

Right.

Q.

And how many horses can be pastured on the

Goodwin farm?
A.

If you go much over 10 head, then the pasture

won't support the horses, and they need to be supplemented
through the winter.
Q*

When we're talking pasturage for the horses,

we're talking about grazing on the Goodwin farm, right?
A.

Yes.

In the winter time, you've got the field,

and in the summertime, you've only got the pasture.
Q.
that —
the —

All right.

On item 3 6 —

if you'd look at

you've placed a value on the leasehold interest on
on the 13-Mile farm of $24,000; correct?

A.

That's what the plaintiff has placed, yes.

Q.

But that does not represent the value of the
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leasehold interest, does it, but represents the value of
the work done for that year?
A.

I think that represents her income.

Q.

Sure. And —

that's income.

That has something

to do with the work that's done and not with just the value
of the leasehold interest.
In other words, you can't get this $24,000
simply by leasing the ground?
A.

Right.

Q.

You've got to work and raise a crop and do all

the things that you have to do and sell it.
If that's the case, then you can realize an
income from it, don't you?
A.

Realize an income from it?

Farming —

if you

want to call it an expensive hobby, sure.
Q.

Well, you put a value of 24,000 on it, right?

A.

Well, that's what I think she made off the

property, yes.
Q.

All right.

You've talked about the gravel pit.

Originally you put a value of a hundred thousand dollars on
it, and today you changed it to 50,000; is that correct?
A.

Yes.

You can put any value there you want,

depending on the buyer.
Q.

So you're telling me that that is not something

that a reasonable buyer would pay to a reasonable seller
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for the gravel pit?
A.

A reasonable seller is the key word there.

Q.

Well, considering you, are you a reasonable

seller?
A.

Me?

Q.

Yeah.

A.

I asked Smithfield for $225 an acre for

sagebrush.
Q.

Did you get it?

A,

No.

Q.

Did you get it on the —

the sale of the — that

portion of the 13-Mile farm that went —
A.

Yes.

Q.

—

A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you be willing to take that gravel pit

on the sagebrush that went there?

yourself at $100,000?
A.

Not at 100,000, no.

Q.

Would you be willing to take it at $50,000?

A.

Where Jetta has the lease on the 13-Mile farm,

and she wants to participate there, I think she ought to
have the income that comes from that also.
Q.
the —

I'm just asking if you would be willing to take

the gravel pit at $50,000.

A.

JJot if it means giving up Nada, no.
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oathf please.

CLIFFORD COOK,
the witness herein, having been
first duly sworn, was examined
and testified as follows:
THE WITNESS:

I do.

THE COURT: Have a seat on the witness stand.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. READING:
Q.

Mr. Cook, please state your name.

A.

Clifford Cook.

Q.

And, Mr. Cook, where do you reside?

A.

Milford.

Q.

And how long have you known the —

the defendant

here, Mr. Craig Davie?
A,

Ever since he was about 12 years old.

Q.

In fact, sir, have you —

have you in the past

run the Nada and Goodwin farm?
A.

Yes, sir.

For about 20 years.

Q.

In fact, you ran those properties just before

Craig took over, did you not?
A*

Yes.

Craig took over in '94. Yeah, '94.

Q.

In those 20 years of running those two places,
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did you ever make a profit?
A.

No.

Q.

I'm going to show you —

A.

You'll have to —

income besides —

you'll have to have other

to make a profit.

MR. READING:

Okay.

It's more of a hobby.

Would you please hand

Mr. Cook D-7.
THE COURT: He says it's a hobby, confirming my
previous suspicion.
Q.

BY MR. READING:

Mr. Cook, on D-7, would you

look down at item 17, which is a four-horse trailer.
A.

Okay.

Q.

Are you aware of a four-horse trailer that is

owned by Mr. Craig Davie?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Do you know whether or not that trailer was

owned by him before the marriage?
A.

Yes, I do.

Because —

Q.

Well, first of all, was it owned by him before

the marriage?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.
THE WITNESS:

Your Honor?

Could I straighten

some of this out for you?
_THE COURT:

No.

Thank you.
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to answer the questions, please.
MR. READING:

Would you please hand the witness

D-ll.
Q.

Mr. Cook, what's been handed to you is a

purported Bill of Sale that was signed by Craig Davie of a
couple horses.
A.

Yes.

Q.

Do you see your signature on that?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Was that, in fact, witnessed at or about the

20th day of December, 1993?
A.

Right.
MR. READING:

No further questions of Mr. Cook.

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. BISHOP:
Q.

Mr. Cook, did I understand you to tell us that

Mr. Craig Davie took over the Goodwin farm in 1994?
A.

I —

no.

I said 19 and 74.

Q.

'74. Okay.

What's the color of the four-horse

trailer that you're talking about?
A.

I believe it's blue.

Q.

What brand is it?

A.

I can't tell you that.

I haven't see it for so

many years, I don't know what brand it is.
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THE COURT: Miss McFall, will you come forward
and face the clerk, raise your right hand and take the
oath, please,

GRACE MCFALL,
the witness herein, having been
first duly sworn, was examined
and testified as follows:
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

I do.

Have a seat on the witness stand.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. READING:
Q.

Please state your name and your residence.

A.

Grace McFall. Milford Flats, Utah.

Q.

Are you presently employed?

A.

Yes, I am.

Q.

By whom?

A.

Craig Davie.

Q.

How long have you been so employed?

A.

Since August 10th or 15th of 1993.

Q.

And what is your rate of compensation?

A.

A hundred dollars a week.

Q.

What is it that you are required to do for that

money?

What is your job?

What do you do?
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A.

Farm labor.

I change water, cut hay, mark

cattle, gather cattle, help do surgeries on cattle, repair
gated pipe, move gated pipe, put it back again.

Whether

it's two hours or a hundred hours a week, the rate of pay
is the same.
Q.

What qualified you for this job —

job before

August of 1993?
A.

The past six years, I have worked for seven or

eight other ranchers.

Billy Dalton, Stanley Dalton, Lyle

Carter, Dean Carter —

there's a long list.

But I've done

farm work for six years.
Q.
you there.

Now, I believe D-ll will probably be in front of
That's the Bill of Sale.

A.

Okay. Uh-huh.

Q.

Describe to me, please, why this Bill of Sale

was —

was signed.

A.

Okay.

When I went to work for Craig and Jetta

in August, Craig said he would make sure that I got paid,
you know, some way.

Don't worry about it. When December

came, it was close to Christmas, you know, and he said, "I
can't pay you."
And I said, "Okay.

That's fine."

Three or four days after Christmas, he came and
brought this in lieu of payment.

At that time, Craig had

signed it and his accountant had signed it.
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when Cliff signed it.
it.

I wasn't there when Cliff signed

But I did tell him —

I said, "To be legal, you know,

it's got to have two signatures."
But it was shortly after Christmas that he came
over, and he gave me — me Misty, especially.

He stated

that Jetta said she didn't want any horses that he broke,
so that he would pay my wages with Misty.
And a yearling filly was bought for my children,
because she is small, and Rosebud is 16 years old.

I hoped

to breed her twice more, and I figured that would help
compensate me for my wages.
Q.

Where do you keep the horses?

A.

I pasture them with Craig.

Q.

Is there any type of compensation that you give

to him for that pasturing privilege?
A.

Okay.

I reside in his house.

the end of October.
five —

I pay him I think it's a hundred and

he's got the records. About $105 for the month for

the board for the three horses.
born —

And have since

But since the foal was

and it's now six months old —

But I don't know.

I pay extra for it.

He's got the records on it.

But there

is a balance still owing and due to me.
Q.

All right.

Does Craig ride any of your horses

without your permission?
A.

No.
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1

MR. READING:

2

THE COURT: All right.

3

MR. BISHOP:

4

That's all I have, Your Honor.

I need to speak with my witness a

moment.

5

THE COURT:

6

(Discussion off the record.)

7

MR. BISHOP:

8

THE COURT:

9

THE WITNESS:

You may.

That's all of this witness.
You may step down.
Thank you.

10

THE COURT: Any other witnesses?

11

MR. BISHOP:

12

THE COURT: Mr. Davie, do you want to come

Yes. Mr. Sheb Davie, please.

13

forward and step up here and face the clerk and raise your

14

right hand and take the oath, please.

15
16

SHEB E. DAVIE,

17

the witness herein, having been

18

first duly sworn, was examined

19

and testified as follows:

20

THE WITNESS: Yes.

21

THE COURT:

22

stand.

23

///

24

///

25

///

Have a seat over here on the witness
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DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BISHOP:
Q.

Mr. Davie, would you tell us your name, please,

A.

Sheb Eugene Davie.

Q*

Where do you live, Mr. Davie?

A.

With my mother in Minersville.

Q.

Do you know Mr. Davie and Mrs. Davie here?

They're your parents, aren't they?
A,

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Davie, how long have your parents been

separated?
A.

Since probably about this time last year.

Q.

Okay.

Since their separation, have you had

occasion and opportunity to visit with your father?
A.

Uh-huh, yes.

Q.

Have you visited with him to his satisfaction?

A.

I don't know what —

to his satisfaction, but

I've visited with him as much as I possibly could.
Q.

Has your mother discouraged you from visiting

with him?
A.

No. Never.

Q.

I see. Do you have any difficulty in visiting

with your father?
A.

No. Not —

I don't have any difficulty with

visiting with my father.
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Q.

Where does he live?

A.

On the Milford flat just before town on the

Goodwin farm.
Q.

Is there anyone that lives in his mobile home

with him?
A.

I —

not that I know of.

Just Gracie —

Q.

Okay.

A.

—

Q.

Do you have any problem in being in the mobile

and her kids.

home with Gracie and her children?
A.

I don't like it.

Q.

I see.

I don't.

Did your mother have anything to do with

this dislike?
A.

No.

Q.

I'm going to ask the bailiff to give you D-ll,

please.
Now, Mr. Davie, will you read D-ll, please.

Do

you see any names of any horses on D-ll?
A.

Yes.

I see the mare, Rosebud.

And I see the

filly, Misty, and the filly Splash both.
Q.

I see. Were you ever promised any one of those

horses?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

That document purports to be a document

transferring those horses from your father to Gracie McFall
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back in December of 1993.
When is the first time you saw that document?
A.

Last night.

Q.

Okay.

Before last night, did your father ever

tell you about the transfer of those horses to Miss McFall?
A.

No.
MR. BISHOP:

I have nothing further of this

witness.
THE COURT: Any questions?
MR. READING:

Just a minute, Your Honor.

(Discussion off the record.)

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. READING:
Q.

Can I call you Sheb?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Why don't you like visiting your dad when Gracie

is in the trailer?
A.

I —

I just don't.

I've heard a lot about

Gracie, and I've seen a lot about her.
12-year-old daughter —
than me.

13.

She once had a

She was just a little older

A year older than me. And just her influence.

And I know she's got it from her parents.

From her mother

and her father.
Q.

Where have you heard about Gracie?
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A.

And I just don't like it.

Q.

Where have you heard about Gracie besides from

her daughter?
A.

I —

the flat.

she's lived in Minersville.

She's lived all over.

Q.

I understand.

She's lived on

I —

But where have you heard things

about Gracie?
THE COURT:
Q.

You mean from whom?

BY MR. READING:

From whom?

Excuse me.

From

whom have you heard things about Gracie?
A.

I don't know.

I couldn't answer that.

Q.

Has your mom talked to you about Gracie?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Has Glade talked to you about Gracie?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

Has that influenced you about your feelings

He talked to me about Gracie.

about Gracie?
A.

No.

Q.

So you had those concerns before you talked to

your mom —
A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.

—

and Glade?

Can you tell me anyone else you've talked to
about —

any other person with whom you've discussed Gracie

besides these two?
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A.

I know my friends. All my friends around me do

not like her.

And they tell me things that she has done.

And some of her kids.

And —

I mean I've been on

playgrounds with them with —

with their kids and

—

Q.

How old are you, sir?

A.

I'm 15.

Q.

Do you know how old Grade's children are?

A.

She has got an eight-year-old, I think, and a

seven.
Q.

And you're 15?

A*

Yeah.

And she has got a daughter.

she must be with a dad —

I don't —

another dad or something like

that.
Q.

Okay.

So she's not around anymore.

Was that the child that you had the most problem
with on the playground?
A.

Probably.

Q.

She's no longer there?

A.

No.

Q.

You love your dad?

A.

Uh-huh, yes.

Q.

Want to continue to have a close association

with him?
A.

Yes.
MR. READING:

No further questions,
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MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

Nothing further of this witness.
You may step down.

Thank you.

Any other witnesses?
MR. BISHOP:
THE COURT:

Mr. Seth Davie, please.
Seth Davie.

SETH CRAIG DAVIE,
the witness herein, having been
first duly sworn, was examined
and testified as follows:
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT:

Have a seat on the witness stand.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BISHOP:
Q.

Mr. Davie, would you tell us your name, please.

A.

Seth Craig Davie.

Q.

Where do you reside?

A*

Do I live?

Q.

Yes. Where do you live?

A.

In Minersville with my mother, Jetta Davie.

Q.

And your father is Mr. Craig Davie here today?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Mr. Davie, I'm going to ask you to look at

what's been admitted as D-ll, which is a document in front
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of you.

Would you look at that.
When is the first time you saw that document?

A.

Last night.

Q.

Okay.

Did you see any horses whose names you

recognize on that document?
A.

Yes. Rosebud, the mare; Misty, the filly, and

Splash, the filly.
Q.

Okay.

Were you ever promised a foal out of one

of those?
A.

Yes. Out of Rosebud.

Q.

Okay.

A*

It was last year when she was bred.

Q.

About what time was she bred?

A.

May.

Q.

Of 1993?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Of '94. I'm sorry.

Q.

Of '94?

A.

I'm sorry.

Q.

Has she foaled yet?

A.

No.

Q.

Do you expect to receive the foal at that time?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

And when did this take place?

And she has —

May of 1994.

She should be in April or May.

At any time before last night, did your
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father tell you that he had transferred those three horses
to Gracie McFall?
A.

No.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

Is this a surprise to you, then?

And, Mr. Davie, your parents have been

separated for how long now?
A.

It's been about a year.

Q.

Have you been able to visit with your father

since that time?
A.

Yes.

Q.

How often do you visit with him?

A.

Just whenever he calls or I call or —

Q.

Okay.

A.

Whenever we want to.

Q.

Has it been left up to you to make those

arrangements?
A.

Yes, it has.

Q.

Has your mother discouraged you from visiting

with your father?
A.

No.

Q.

Did you have any difficulties in visiting with

your father?
A.

No.

Q.

Do you have any difficulties with one Gracie

Not — huh-uh.
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McFall?
A.

Yes.

A little.

Q.

What is the difficulty there, if any?

A.

I just like to visit with my father.

Q.

Is that just a personal preference on your part?

A.

Yes.
MR. BISHOP:

Just him.

I have nothing further of this

witness.
THE COURT:

Questions?

CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. READING:
Q.

Seth, how many horses do you have?

A.

Me?

Q.

Uh-huh.

A.

I have one.

Q.

Okay.

have to help me.

And with this foal or —
I'm a city boy.

you're going to

With this colt that is

coming, that will be your second horse?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And the horse that you presently have —

how did

you come by that horse?
A.

It was given to —

to me by my mother and my

father.
Q.

Okay.

Do you want to continue to have a close
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relationship with your dad?
A.

Yes.

I would love to.

Q.

Do you know that he loves you?

A.

Yes.
MR. READING:
MR. BISHOP:

Okay.

No further questions.

Nothing further.

THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. BISHOP:

You can step down.

That's all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any surrebuttal?
MR. READING:
THE COURT:

Heck no.

Okay.

That concludes the

presentation of evidence in the matter.

It's now 5:30.

Pursuant to our discussion in chambers, we're going to
recess for the evening, and counsel may submit their
closing arguments in writing and in so doing attempt to
rectify the various lists that have been given setting
forth those issues that are resolved by agreement and those
issues that still need to be decided by the Court.
How soon can you do that?
MR. BISHOP:
Honor.

I'd need at least 2 0 days, Your

I have quite a heavy court schedule.
MR. READING:

That would be —

that would be

acceptable with me.
THE COURT:

Do you want to each submit your list

simultaneously or your responses simultaneously or your
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arguments?
MR. BISHOP:

Let's do this, Your Honor.

I think

we need to get together on this list —
MR. READING:
MR. BISHOP:

That first.
—

somehow.

And once we have that

list, then of course the argument will fall into line.

To

try to do argument before we put the list together is —
THE COURT: Right.
MR. BISHOP:

—

Let's say this.
list together?

is a difficult problem.
Can we have 20 days to get the

And then within 10 days thereafter submit

simultaneous —
MR. READING:

That will be fine.

THE COURT: All right.

That's the order.

20

days from today to put the list together indicating what's
been resolved and what still needs to be decided.

And then

10 days thereafter for each side to submit written
argument.

And thereafter, we'll either set it for oral

argument, or I'll decide it under 4-501, depending how you
want to submit it.
MR. BISHOP: At this point, we suggest that we
submit it on the documents. Although that may change.

I

think that's our idea, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right.

We're in recess.

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded at 5:30 P.M.)

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER

Addendum "p": Relevant Portions of Reporter's Hearing Transcript
Dated September 6, 1995
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division of the cattle, that the "MC" ear mark and brand
may be awarded to Mr. Davie?
MS. DAVIE: That's fine.
MR. BISHOP:

Not a problem.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. READING:

That takes care of that one.

The other issue is concerning the

Goodwin property, Your Honor. And if —

if the Court

recalls, this was the lease to Mr. Davie.
THE COURT:

I do.

MR. READING:

And it —

it concerns me a little

bit that it appears that there might be an inconsistency in
the order of the Court, wherein it states that the Court
fixes the value of that lease at $3,000 per year times 30
years, which equals a total current value of $90,000,
when —

and there's no discounting the present value of

that stream of payments.
THE COURT: Yes, there is.

It just isn't

included in that calculation.
MR. READING:

I see.

Okay.

Well, as long as —

as long as the Court is aware of that.
THE COURT:

I am.

That's the value that I fixed

as the current value.
MR. READING:

All right. And the other issue

that I had is that there was no specific findings, as it
was, with the —
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MR. BISHOP:
MR. READING:
residence, wherein we —

Cow Hollow.
—

Cow Hollow and with the marital

we showed the Court the lease

where my client was the sole lessee with the children with
reversionary interest and no assignment value, so why did
the Court believe that to be marital property.
THE COURT: Which?
MR. READING:
Your Honor.

The lease of the Goodwin property,

This lease was solely in my client's name,

with reversion to the children if they desired to farm it.
But the defendant was —

the plaintiff was specifically

excluded from it, and there was no assignment rights in
that lease.
I think it would be helpful if the Court would
help us understand why either —

I guess through her sweat

equity or something.
THE COURT: That's what I had in mind, was that
she had been helping to farm the property and had developed
considerable sweat equity therein.
MR. BISHOP:

Right. We —

we put on substantial

evidence concerning what they did on it.
MR. READING:

That's correct.

THE COURT: That's correct.
MR. READING:

And I think that might assist us

if those findings were there as they were with the other
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Addendum "O": Relevant Portion of Trial Exhibit PI, Goodwin
Lease Dated April 30, 1984
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T H I S INDENTURE, made this v%?
day of
rfA*/t/±
,
198^, b y and b e t w e e n ROSEMARY BOWMAN, dealing with h e r sole and
s e p a r a t e p r o p e r t y , of Farmington, San J u a n C o u n t y , State of New
Mexico, h e r e i n r e f e r r e d to as "Lessor", which e x p r e s s i o n shall include
L e s s o r ' s h e i r s , e x e c u t o r s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , a s s i g n s , and successors in
i n t e r e s t , and CRAIG DAVIE of Post Office Box 111, Minersville, Utah,
84752, h e r e i n r e f e r r e d to as "Lessee", which e x p r e s s i o n shall include
L e s s e e ! s h e i r s , e x e c u t o r s , and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s , WITNESSETH:
1. DEMISE OF PREMISES. L e s s o r , for a n d in consideration of the
c o v e n a n t s and a g r e e m e n t s herein contained to b e k e p t and performed by
Lessee,
Lessee's
heirs,
executors,
administrators,
assigns
and
s u c c e s s o r s in i n t e r e s t , and upon the terms and conditions herein
c o n t a i n e d , does h e r e b y let, lease and demise to Lessee t h e following
d e s c r i b e d p r o p e r t y , h e r e i n a f t e r called the P r e m i s e s , s i t u a t e in the
C o u n t y of B e a v e r , S t a t e of Utah, more p a r t i c u l a r l y described as
follows:
V7-1/2 SV/-1/4 S e c . 17, T28S, R10W, SLM.

Contains 80 a c r e s

ALSO commencing at SW co of E - l / 2 SVf-1/4 Sec. 17, t h e n c e E
28 r d s N 160 r d s ; \\ 28 r d s ; S 160 r d s . Contains 28 a c r e s
N E - 1 / 4 N E - 1 / 4 ; V7-1/2 NE-1/4 Sec. 18, T28S, R10V;, SLM total
120 a c r e s LESS 1.13 acres for r o a d .
Net in this parcel
c o n t a i n s 118.87 a c r e s
S E - 1 / 4 N E - 1 / 4 S e c . 18, T28S, R10W, SLM. Contains 40 acres
Commencing at SE C o r n e r Sec. 7, T28S, RIOVv, SLM: thence
W 1320 f t . ; N 515 f t . ; S 88°45' E 1320 f t . ; S 482 ft. to the
beginning.
C o n t a i n s 14.57 acres
W - l / 2 NV7-1/4 S e c . 17, T28S, R10V7, SLM. Contains 80 acres
Commencing SW C o r n e r Sec. 8, T28S, R10W, SLM, t h e n c e 80
r d s ; n 598 ft, NV/'ly along H'way 1,013 f t . ; V; 823 f t . , S 80
r d s . to b e g i n n i n g . Contains 35.9 acres
T h i s p r o p e r t y is subject to a life e s t a t e of Mrs.
Cuma
Goodwin to live in t h e residence located on t h i s p r o p e r t y .
T h i s Lease is made specifically subject to that life e s t a t e .
L e s s o r h e r e i n r e s e r v e s the righ* to sell, g i v e , t r a n s f e r or convey
b y d e e d o u t of t h e d e n i s e d p r o p e r t i e s to t h e b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r s of
Lessee h e r e i n , five a c r e s to each b r o t h e r and s i s t e r , upon ninety (90)
d a y s w r i t t e n n o t i c e to t h e Lessee.
Said Notice shall include a
d e s c r i p t i o n of t h e l a n d and t h e name of the p e r s o n the p r o p e r t y will be
deeded to.
2. TERM OF LEASE. The term of this Lease shall be for a period
of f o r t y (4U) y e a r s , beginning on the 1st day of March, 1983 and
e n d i n g on t h e 28th d a y of F e b r u a r y , 2023.
3. R E N T . L e s s e e , for and in consideration of t h i s Lease and the
demise of t h e s a i d p r e m i s e s by Lessor to L e s s e e , h e r e b y a g r e e s and
c o v e n a n t s with L e s s o r to p a y as r e n t for t h e said p r e m i s e s , without
notice or d e m a n d , t h e sum of One Dollar ($1.00) p e r y e a r , payable on
t h e f i r s t day of March of each y e a r h e r e a f t e r .
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4. USE OF PREMISES. Lessee, for and in consideration of this
Lease and the demise of the said premises by Lessor to Lessee, hereby
agrees and covenants with Lessor to use and occupy the said premises
for the purpose of planting, growing and harvesting those crops that
are specified in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and may be used as the
residence of the Lessee and his family. The premises shall not be used
for any other purpose without the prior written consent of the Lessor.
5. OPERATIONS ON PREMISES. All operations conducted on the
premises by the Lessee as incidents of any of the uses specified in
paragraph 4 of this Lease shall be conducted by the Lessee in
accordance with the best course of husbandry practiced in the
geographical vicinity of the premises. Should the Lessee fail to take
any action required by the best course of husbandry practiced in the
geographical vicinity of the premises or should the Lessee fail to
Conduct any operation undertaken by him on the premises in accordance
with the best course of husbandry practiced in ths geographical vicinity
of the premises, the Lessor may, after serving ten days' written notice
of such failure on the Lessee in the manner provided for services of
notices in this Lease, enter the premises and take such action as the
Lessor may deem necessary to protect his interest in this Lease and in
the premises. Lessee agrees to reimburse the Lessor on demand for the
Cost of any actions taken by the Lessor pursuant to the provisions of
this paragraph.
6.
UTILITIES.
The Lessee shall pay all charges for the
furnishing ot gas, electricity,
and other public utilities to the premises
including any tax or assessment imposed on the premises for any
irrigation district for the furnishing of water thereto.
7. WASTE OR NUISANCE. The Lessee shall not commit or permit
the commission by others of any waste on the premises; the Lessee shall
not maintain, commit or permit the maintenance or commission of any
nuisance as defined in
on the premises; and the Lessee
shall not use or permit the use of the premises for any unlawful
purpose.
8. INSURANCE HAZARDS. The Lessee shall not commit or permit
the commission of any hazardous acts on the premises nor use or permit
the use of the premises in any manner that will increase the existing
rates for or cause the cancellation of any fire, liability, or other
insurance policy insuring the premises, the improvements and the crops
on the premises.
The Lessee shall, at his own cost and expense,
comply with any and all requirements of Lessor's insurance carriers
necessary for the continued maintenance at reasonable rates of
reasonable fire and liability insurance on ths premises and the
improvements and crops thereon. •
9.
MAINTENANCE.
The Lessee shall, at his own cost and
expense keep and maintain the premises, all improvements on the
premises and all facilities appurtenant to the premises in good order
and repair and in as safe and clean a condition as they were when
received by him from the Lessor, reasonable wear and tear excepted.
10. ALTERATIONS AND LIENS. The Lessee shall not make or
permit any other person to make any alterations to the premises or to
any improvement thereon or facility appurtenant thereto without .the
written consent of the Lessor first had and obtained. The Lessee shall
keep the premises free and clear from any and all Hens, claims and
demands for work performed, materials furnished, or operations
conducted thereon at the instance or request of Lessee.
11. INSPECTION BY LESSOR. The Lessee shall permit the Lessor
or the Lessor's agents, representatives or employees to enter the
premises at all reasonable times for the purpose of inspecting the
2

premises to determine whether the Lessee is complying with the terms of
this Lease and for the purpose of doing other lawful acts that may be
necessary to protect the Lessor's interest in the premises.
12. ACCEPTANCE BY LESSEE. The Lessee accepts the premises,
as well as the improvements thereon and the facilities appurtenant
thereto, in their present condition. The Lessee agrees with, and
represents to the Lessor, that the premises have been inspected by him
and that he has been assured by means independent of the Lessor or
any agent of the Lessor of the truth of all facts materials to this Lease
and that the premises are being leased by the Lessee as a result of his
inspection and investigation and not as a result of any representations
made b y the Lessor or any agent of the Lessor.
13. HOLD HARMLESS. The Lessee agrees to indemnify and hold
the Lessor and the property of the Lessor, including the premises, free
and harmless from any and all claims, liability, loss, damage or expense
resulting from the Lessee's occupation and use of the premises,
specifically including without limitations any claim, liability, loss or
damage arising:
(a) By reason of the injury to person or property, from whatever
cause, while in or on the premises or in any way connected with the
premises or with the improvements or personal property in or on the
premises including any liability for injury to the person or personal
property of the Lessee, his agents, officers or employees;
(b)
By reason of any work performed on the premises or
materials furnished to the premises at the instance or request of the
Lessee, his agents or employees;
(c) By reason of the Lessee's failure to perform any provision of
this Lease or to comply with any requirement imposed on him or on the
premises by any duly authorized governmental agency or political
subdivision;
(d) Because of the Lessee's failure or inability to pay as they
become due any obligations incurred by him in the agricultural or other
operations to be conducted by him on the premises.
14.
SUBLEASING AND ASSIGNING.
The Lessee shall not
encumber, assign, or otherwise transfer this Lease, any right or
interest in this Lease, or any right or interest in the premises or anv
of the improvements that may now or hereafter be constructed or
installed on the premises. Neither shall the Lessee sublet the premises
or any part thereof or allow any other persons, other than the Lessee's
agents, family and s e r v a n t s , to occupy or use the premises or any part
thereof. Any encumbrance, assignment, transfer or subletting of the
Lessee, whether it be voluntary or involuntary, by operation of law or
otherwise, is void and shall, at the option of the Lessor, terminate this
Lease.
15. ABANDONMENT BY LESSEE. Should the Lessee breach this
Lease and abandon the premises prior to the natural termination of the
term of this Lease, the Lessor may:
(a) Continue this Lease in effect by not terminating the Lessee's
right to possession of the premises, in which event the Lessor shall be
entitled to enforce all his rights and remedies under this Lease
including the right to recover the rent specified in this Lease as "it
becomes due under this lease; or
(b)

Terminate this Lease and recover from the Lessee:
(1)

The worth at the time of award of the unpaid rent which
3
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bad been earned at the time of termination of the lease;
(2) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which
the unpaid rent which would have been earned after termination of
the Lease until the time of award exceeds the amount of rental loss
t*nat the "Lessee proves could Yiave been reasonably avoided;
(3) The worth at the time of award of the amount by which
the unpaid rent for the balance of the term after the time of a^ard
exceeds the amount of rental loss that the Lessee proves could be
reasonably voided; and
(4) Any other amount necessary to compensate the Lessoi*
for all detriment proximately caused by the Lessee1 s failure to
perform his obligations under this lease.
16.
DEFAULT BY LESSEE.
All covenants and agreements
contained in this Lease are declared to be conditions to this Lease and
to the term hereby demised to the Lessee. Should the Lessee default in
the performance of any covenants, condition or agreement contained in
this Lease the Lessor may terminate this Lease and re-enter and regain
possession of the premises in the manner then provided by the laws of
unlawful detainer of the State of Utah then in effect.
17.
TERMINATION OF LEASE.
Notwithstanding any of the
provisions contained in this Lease, this Lease shall termir-ate
automatically if, for any 364 day period, no husbandry operations are
undertaken by the Lessee herein, unless the reason for the lack of
husbandry operations is the direct result of weather conditions outside
the control of Lessee. If for any reason, including weather conditions
outside the control of Lessee, husbandry operations are not undertaken
by Leasee for a period of two consecutive 364 day periods, this l£ase
shall automatically terminate.
IJ^arv t h e de^th of. t h e Lessee herein, this Le^se s\vaA\ \*TTO&Ate
automatically upon the expiration of five (5) years from the date of the
death of the Lessee or upon the 21st birthday of the twin minor boys of
the Lessee, Seth and Sheb Davie, whichever event shall occur first.
All other terms and conditions of this Lease shall remain in effect and
be binding upon Seth and Sheb Davie.
18. INSOLVENCY OF LEASE. The insolvency of the Lessee as
evidenced by a receiver being appointed to take possession of all or
substantially all of the property of the Lessee, the making of a general
assignment for the benefit of creditors by the Lessee, or the
adjudication of t'n* L11 > v\ r.r. ? hankrvr* vTc'ry the Federal Bankruptcy
Act shall terminate this lease and entitle the Lessor to re-enter and
regain possession of the premises.
19.
ATTORNEYS FEES.
Should any litigation be commenced
between the parties to this Lease concerning the premises, this Lease
or the rights and duties in relation thereto, the p a r t y , Lessor or
Lessee, prevailing in such litigation shall be entitled, in addition to
such other relief as may be granted, to a reasonable sum as and for his
attorneys fees in such litigation which shall be determined by the Court
in such litigation or in a separate action brought for that purpose.
20' NOTICES. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
any and all notices or other communications required or permitted by
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t h i s Lease or b y law t o b e s e r v e d on or given to e i t h e r p a r t y h e r e t o b y
t h e o t h e r p a r t y h e r e t o shall be in writing and shall b e deemed duly
s e r v e d a n d given w h e n p e r s o n a l l y delivered to the p a r t y to whom it is
d i r e c t e d , or in lieu of s u c h personal service when deposited in t h e
United S t a t e s mail, f i r s t - c l a s s postage p r e p a i d , a d d r e s s e d to t h e Lessee
at t h e a d d r e s s of t h e premises or to t h e Lessor at 2016 Santiago,
F a r m i n g t o n , New Mexico, 87401.
Either p a r t y , t h e Lessor or the
L e s s o r , may c h a n g e t h e i r a d d r e s s for t h e p u r p o s e of t h i s p a r a g r a p h by
g i v i n g w r i t t e n n o t i c e of s u c h change to t h e p a r t y in t h e manner
p r o v i d e d in t h i s p a r a g r a p h .
21.
HEIRS AND SUCCESSORS.
This lease shall b e binding on
and shall i n u r e to t h e benefit of the h e i r s , e x e c u t o r s , a d m i n i s t r a t o r s ,
s u c c e s s o r s a n d a s s i g n s of t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o , b u t n o t h i n g in this
p a r a g r a p h c o n t a i n e d shall b e c o n s t r u e d as a consent b y t h e Lessor to
a n y a s s i g n m e n t of t h i s Lease or any i n t e r e s t t h e r e i n b y t h e L e s s e e .
22. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE.
t h e e s s e n c e of t h i s L e a s e .

Time is e x p r e s s l y declared to b e

23. WAIVER. T h e waiver of any b r e a c h of any t h e provisions of
t h i s Lease b y t h e L e s s o r shall not constitute a continuing waiver or a
w a i v e r of a n y s u b s e q u e n t b r e a c h b y the Lessee either of t h e same or of
a n o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s L e a s e .
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ROSEMARY BOWMAN
Lessor

"CRAIGMBAVIE
Lessee
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